One Nation, Individisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace Fairness by Mehri, Cyrus et al.
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 9, Number 2 2004 Article 3
One Nation, Individisible: The Use of
Diversity Report Cards to Promote
Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace
Fairness
Cyrus Mehri∗ Andrea Giampetro-Meyer†
Michael B. Runnels‡
∗
†
‡
Copyright c©2004 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE: THE USE OF
DIVERSITY REPORT CARDS TO PROMOTE
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
WORKPLACE FAIRNESS
Cyrus Mehri"
Andrea Giampetro-Meyer"
Michael B. Runnels*
Some commentators have suggested that our country's future is at
risk because individuals and corporations have engaged in acts that have
"betrayed the values of openness, that lie at the heart of a healthy,
prosperous" just America.' The wave of financial failures and scandals
heralded by Enron 2 has put at risk "the trust that investors, employees
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1. John McCain, The Free Market Needs New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at
A19. McCain writes: "[t]o love the free market is to loathe the scandalous behavior of
those who have betrayed the values of openness that lie at the heart of a healthy and
prosperous capitalist system." Id. McCain continues his call for increased openness by
reminding us that "[w]hat is at risk is the trust that investors, employees and all
Americans have in our markets and, by extension, in the country's future." Id.
2. Readers who want to review details of recent business scandals should review
the work of New York Times reporter Kurt Eichenwald. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald,
Operating Profits: Mining Medicare: How One Hospital Benefited from Questionable
Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at Al (Redding Medical Center); Kurt Eichenwald
& John Markoff, Deception, or Just Disarray, at Enron?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at
Al; Kurt Eichenwald, For WorldCom, Acquisitions Were Behind Its Rise and Fall,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at Al; Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The
Accountants; Miscues, Missteps and the Fall of Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at
Cl; Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse; Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a
Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al.
Eichenwald has reported on high-profile business scandals and failures for
years. Notably, he followed carefully the scandal of Archer Daniels Midland Company,
"Supermarket to the World," which in 1995 was accused of violating federal law by
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and all Americans have in our markets and, by extension, in our
country's future."3 Similarly, a wave of workforce diversity failures and
scandals 4 has put at risk the trust that investors, employees and all
Americans have in human resources systems, which are meant to judge
and reward employees based upon their effort, initiative, and merit,
rather than upon the color of their skin.' This wave of workforce
diversity failures has brought to the public's attention evidence that
supports Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg's recent assertion in Grutter v.
Bollinger,6 that "[c]onscious and unconscious race bias... remain alive
in our land, impeding realization of our highest values and ideals."7
engaging in price fixing. See KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (Broadway Books
2000). He also provided careful reporting of a race discrimination lawsuit we describe
later in this article, Roberts v. Texaco Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Eichenwald also broke the news of "The Texaco tapes," which provided evidence of
Texaco's destruction of documents relevant to the case. He also reported that Texaco
executives were caught on tape making disparaging remarks about African-American
and Jewish employees. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape, Discussed
Impending Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Texaco Executives,
On Tape].
For books that describe the recent failures and scandals, see BARBARA LEY
TOFFLER & JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL
OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (Broadway Books 2003); MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON
WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE ENRON COLLAPSE (Crown
Publishers 2003); ARIANA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH: How CORPORATE
GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA (Double Day 2003);
ROBERT BRYCE & MOLLY IVANS, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF
ENRON (Public Affairs 2002); LOREN Fox, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (Wiley, John &
Sons, Inc. 2002); MONICA LANGLEY, TEARING DOWN THE WALLS: How SANDY WEILL
FOUGHT HIS WAY To THE TOP OF THE FINANCIAL WORLD... AND THEN NEARLY LOST
IT ALL (Free Press 2002); LYNN BREWER & MATTHEW SCOTT HANSEN, HOUSE OF
CARDS: CONFESSIONS OF AN ENRON EXECUTIVE (Virtual Bookworm.corn Publishing
2002).
3. McCain, supra note 1, at A19.
4. See infra notes 210-47 and accompanying text for a description of litigation
alleging systemic race discrimination at four American corporations.
5. See EVERETT CARLL LADD, THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY: AN EXPLORATION OF
THE ORIGINS, MEANING, AND ROLE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS 11 (1994). Ladd
describes the core American value of individualism, which emphasizes upward mobility
based upon merit. Ladd's monograph was produced by The Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research in Storrs, Connecticut. Id.
6. 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).
7. Id. at 2347 (concurring opinion of Justice Ginsberg).
USE OF DIVERSITY REPORT CARDS
The purpose of this Article is to provide support for the proposition
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt the proposal
we outline for improved information gathering and reporting of specific
kinds of employment data. Now that the SEC is in the midst of major
reform efforts to improve information gathering and reporting of
financial data as a response to recent corporate scandals, the agency
should also mandate improved information gathering and reporting of
workforce diversity and fairness data. Improved information gathering
and reporting of financial and employment data allows critical
information to bubble up8 to the attention of senior management, boards
of directors, and other corporate stakeholders, especially investors.
Improved information gathering and reporting can benefit all
stakeholders.9
Section I of the Article draws on academic work in the field of
Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter CSR)'0 to present the
philosophical basis for arguments both in favor of increased corporate
transparency and accountability, in general, and specifically in regards
to corporate social disclosures (also referred to as social reporting). This
section is important because it provides background information that
helps the reader understand the remainder of the Article. Section II
explains SEC requirements for gathering and reporting financial data,
reviews the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and explains a framework for
determining the circumstances under which the SEC should mandate
disclosure of information that is socially relevant, but not typically
associated with a company's financial well-being." Section III is
practical. After reviewing recent workforce diversity failures and
8. Stephen D. Poss, Counseling the Audit Committee, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 2003, at
18.
9. See infra note 253-54 and accompanying text.
10. For books that outline fundamental principles of Corporate Social
Responsibility, see, for example, ADRIAN HODGES & DAVID GRAYSON, EVERYBODY'S
BUSINESS (DK Publishing 2002); SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION (Earthscan
Publications 2001); AMORY HU PAUL & LOVINS HAWKEN, NATURAL CAPITALISM (Little
Brown & Company 1999); JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE
BOTTOM LINE OF 21 ST CENTURY BUSINESS (CONSCIENTIOUS COMMERCE) (New Society
Pub 1998).
11. This section relies on information in Note, Should the SEC Expand
Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements? 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433 (2002) [hereinafter
Nonfinancial Disclosure]. This Harvard Note responds to a seminal article by Cynthia
A. Williams that argues in favor of mandatory social disclosure. See infra note 21.
2004] 397
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scandals, this section sketches a sample Diversity Report Card we
believe publicly traded companies should submit as part of their annual
filings with the SEC. The section also explains relationships between
our proposal and Section II's argument in favor of mandatory social
disclosure. Section IV's conclusion brings the reader full circle by tying
together the Article's primary themes. The Article concludes that
Diversity Report Cards simultaneously promote transparency,
accountability, and workplace fairness.
I. BACKGROUND: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CALLS FOR
INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Corporate Social Responsibility
1. The Predominant Perspective
Scholars who study the topic of corporate social responsibility
(CSR)12 provide the broadest endorsements for improved information
gathering and reporting of corporate operations. The topic of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) answers the question, "What is the purpose
12. See Daniel T. Ostas & Stephen E. Loeb, Teaching Corporate Social
Responsibility 20 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 62 (2002). Ostas and Loeb explain that most
scholars would acknowledge that most academic conversations about the topic of
corporate social responsibility or CRS fall under the general topic of business and
society. Id. at 62. Ostas and Loeb divide this field into three branches. They write:
The descriptive branch [of business and society] examines the relationship between
corporations and the society in which they operate. The managerial branch advises
managers on how best to achieve social and economic goals once those norms are
identified. The CSR branch... is normative. It asks the fundamental questions of
what goals the firm ought to seek.
Id. Ultimately, Ostas & Loeb write that CSR should be defined in this way: "Corporate
managers should seek creative ways to discover and cooperate with the social and
ethical norms that underlie and inform the public policies governing the corporation's
principle business operations while simultaneously seeking to enhance firm
profitability." Id. at 71-72. They urge those who teach CSR to refrain from framing the
field as we have done in this article, as a debate between shareholder and stakeholder
perspectives. See id. at 86. Legal scholars, though, still frame the debate in this way.
See, e.g., Williams, infra note 16.
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of a corporation?"' 3 Economists,14 lawyers," professors/scholars, 6 and
social activists" have argued for decades about the nature of the
13. Charles Handy, What's a Business For?, HARV. Bus. REv. 49 (Dec. 2002).
Handy argues in favor of a progressive perspective, pointing out that American-style
capitalism has failed to recognize the value in its most important asset-its employees.
It has also failed to look out for consumers. Handy writes that, if we fail to ask
fundamental questions about what a business is for, "[h]igh-minded talent may start to
shun [business] and customers may desert it." Id. at 55.
14. Milton Friedman is the most well-known economist arguing about corporate
social responsibility. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, in BUSINESS ETHICS: AN
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS SERIES 11-17 (Tamara L. Roleff ed. 1996).
15. See, e.g., David Hess, Social Reporting. A Reflexive Law Approach to
Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999). Hess, a lawyer and scholar
in the area of business ethics, argues in favor of a progressive model of CSR. Id. One
clear sign of his preference for this view comes in the two sentences of his article,
where he writes: "If people cannot accurately know their world, how can they be
expected to act wisely in it. If corporations were required to disclose information about
their actions affecting [stakeholders], then pressure would mount to justify those acts;
and justifying one's acts, most ethicists would grant, is the first step toward improving
one's behavior." Id. at 41 (citing Walter Lippman, a 20th century political commentator
as the source of the quote in the first sentence and citing business ethicist Thomas
Donaldson for the second sentence, at THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS &
MORALITY 204 (1982)).
16. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 705, 711-17 (2002) [hereinafter Era of
Economic Globalization]. Williams, a law professor at the University of Illinois,
categorizes the corporate social responsibility literature into three positions. Id. She
labels them (1) the irresponsible position (a corporation is a legal fiction and, as such,
cannot have social or moral obligations), (2) the predominant position (corporate
managers should act in the interests of shareholders), and (3) the progressive position
(corporate managers should act in the interests of all stakeholders). Id. Williams
highlights the work of scholars from the field of corporation law to explain the three
views she delineates. Id. This uses two of Williams' labels in its analysis, the
predominant position and the progressive position.
17. See, e.g., RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE Do BAD THINGS (1996). Estes is Emeritus Professor of
Accounting at American University. He leads an organization called The Stakeholder
Alliance, which "seeks to change the corporate system to make it responsible to all
stakeholders, instead of only to stockholders, and thus return corporations to their
original public purpose." Information about the Stakeholder Alliance is available at
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/sa-desc.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). For this
organization's views on disclosure of equal employment opportunity data, see
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/equity.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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corporation's relationship with and obligations to society, including their
obligations to gather and report accurate information to a variety of
stakeholders. 8 General debates about the appropriate relationship
between the corporation and society inform and underlie arguments
about the worth of increased corporate transparency and accountability
as objectives.19 The debate also triggers more practical questions, such
as whether, with regard to the information gathering and reporting
process: (1) outside auditors should play a role,20 (2) standards should be
voluntary or mandated by government agencies acting on behalf of the
public, 2' and (3) particular drawbacks might make increased
transparency and accountability undesirable.22 How an individual
responds to both the broad, philosophical questions about CSR and
practical questions about information gathering/reporting depends upon
whether that individual believes that corporate actors should act
primarily in the interests of the shareholders, or whether they should act
in the interests of a broad range of constituents, including shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, and communities.23
Milton Friedman articulated the shareholder or predominant
perspective in 1970.4 He believes that the primary purpose of business
is to maximize profits for shareholders.25 He explains that managers
18. For a thorough review of academic literature in the field of CSR, see Ostas &
Loeb, supra note 12, at 64-76.
19. See generally Handy supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen:
Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725 (2003)
(questioning the extent to which accountants can police themselves).
21. For an argument in favor of mandatory disclosure, see Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1266 (1999). Williams' article is probably the leading article to date that
explores the corporate social relationship. This article compares financial disclosure to
social disclosure and argues in favor of social disclosure as a way to promote corporate
accountability. Id.
22. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 20.
23. See Ostas & Loeb supra note 12.
24. Ostas & Loeb trace the development of this concept back to the 1950's. See
Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 64. This Article follows Cynthia A. Williams' lead in
labeling Friedman's perspective the predominant position. See Williams, supra note 16.
25. Friedman, supra note 14. Friedman writes that:
A corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct business in
accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as
USE OF DIVERSITY REPORT CARDS
must act as agents of the company's owners/investors.26 Their "one and
only one responsibility... is to use [the corporation's] resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud."27
It is important to note two of Friedman's preferences and
assumptions, as they inform current debates about links between CSR
and information gathering and reporting.28 First, Friedman's work
shows a preference for the value of freedom.29  He generally wants
business to operate free of rules imposed by others.3" Second, Friedman
does not trust government actors.3' He writes in pejorative terms about
"control... by external forces" and "the iron fist of government
bureaucrats. 32
Those who place the value of freedom above other ethical norms
while at the same time assuming government actors are bureaucrats
rather than public servants, generally do not like the idea of outside
auditors stepping in to look at corporate records.33 These same writers
may also argue that any attempt to gather information and disclose it to
the company should be voluntary, not imposed by the government's iron
fist.3 4  Finally, advocates of a predominant view of CSR will see
drawbacks with regard to increased transparency and accountability that
possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in
law and those embodied in ethical custom.
Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 17. Of course, the economy has changed since Friedman wrote his essay.
For instance, the relationship between markets and government action has changed,
especially in light of the role of nonprofit organizations in taking over tasks traditionally
undertaken by the government. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and
the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J. LAW & EcON. 437 (1995). An additional
significant change is that the economy is much more global. See Nancy L. Kaszak,
Practicing Law in the Global Economy, 22 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 1 (2001).
28. Friedman, supra note 14, at 17.
29. Friedman writes in favor of a "free society." Id. at 16. See also generally
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1963, reprinted
in 2002).
30. Friedman, supra note 14, at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 20 (arguing that the SEC has failed).
34. Id.
2004]
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might make new requirements seem undesirable.35 For those who
adhere to the predominant view, the costs of increased transparency and
accountability might outweigh the benefits.36
2. The Progressive Perspective
The rationale that underlies the stakeholder or progressive
perspective originates from the history of U.S. corporate charters.3 7 U.S.
corporations were, in fact, not originally chartered by society to merely
provide a return to shareholders.38 "Corporations in colonial America
were originally given charters in order to serve the public good."39 More
specifically, the progressive view, best articulated,
[S]uggests that corporate managers' underlying social obligations are
more extensive than maximizing shareholders' wealth within the
confines of the law.... [D]irectors ought to consider the impact of
their decisions on a wider range of constituents than shareholders,
and thus ought to consider the implications of their actions on
employees, consumers, suppliers (in some cases), the community,
and the environment.
40
Some writers have suggested that, considering the growing
presence of corporations in our lives, it seems difficult, if not
irresponsible, to advocate for a system of corporate governance solely
reliant on the predominant perspective.4' In citing Professor Lawrence
Mitchell, Douglas M. Branson provides insightful parameters to the
debate:
[N]o institution other than the state so dominates our public
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ralph Estes, What You Count, You Get, IN CONTEXT, no. 41 (1995), reprinted
in BusINEss ETHIcs, at 30-31, Corporations Must Serve the Public Interest (Tamara L.
Roleff ed., 1996)
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Williams, supra note 16, at 716.
41. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reforn" and the New
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 605, 606 (2001) (discussing the
primacy of the shareholder versus stakeholder debate to the current discourse regarding
CSR).
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discourse and our private lives .... [C]orporations make most
everything we consume. Their advertising and products fill almost
every waking moment of our lives. They give us jobs, and
sometimes a sense of identity. They define communities, and
enhance both our popular and serious culture. They present the
investment opportunities that send our children to college, and
provide for our old age. They fund our research.
Individually and collectively, though, large corporations' presence
may also harm us:
They pollute our environments. They impoverish our spirits with the
never-ending messages of the virtues of consumerism. They provide
a living, but often not a meaning. And sometimes they destroy us;
our retirement expectations are unfounded, our investment hopes are
dashed, our communities are left impoverished. The very power that
corporations have over our lives means that, intentionally or not,
they profoundly affect our lives.
4 2
In light of the pervasiveness of corporations in our lives, advocates
of the progressive perspective argue that corporations must view
themselves beholden to both shareholders and stakeholders.43
Utilizing the progressive perspective regarding corporate disclosure
reveals improved responses to the current crisis in corporate
transparency and accountability.44  Prevalent problems with bad
corporate actors are not new, of course.45 Indeed, it is because of
unethical corporate actors that the laissez-faire character of Friedman's
position proves unworkable. 6 As a practical matter, the necessity of
42. Id. at 640-41 (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at
xii (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995).
43. See Williams, supra note 16, at 707. Williams argues that:
[t]he corporation is both: an economic and a social entity; a private actor and a public
actor; an entity that depends upon and gives particular legal consideration to
shareholders; and an entity that depends upon and is composed of the specific inputs
and relationships with multiple stakeholders and which gives consistent, pragmatic
consideration to those stakeholders.
Id.
44. Id. at 716.
45. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 66.
46. Id. at 66. In Ostas's and Loeb's discussion of Howard Bowen's Social
Responsibilities of the Businessman, they note that the rise of government regulation of
business ethics was a response to widespread unethical corporate behavior:
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outside auditors verifying corporate disclosures is an essential response
to the failings of laissez faire practices.47 Particularly in terms of
corporations disclosing information on their compliance with anti-
discrimination laws, what Hess calls "social reporting," verification by
outside auditors is a must.4  Such social reporting, if it is to be
meaningful, must be mandatory.49 Corporations may provide a myriad of
Bowen argued that the viability of a laissezfaire social system presupposed a system
of business ethics. Ethical duties included, among other things, tacit obligations:
(1) to observe the rules of property; (2) to honor contracts; (3) to refrain from
deception and fraud; (4) to be efficient and to promote economic progress; (5) to
protect life, limb, and health of workers and of the general public; (6) to compete
vigorously, and in [the absence] of competition to act with restraint ....
Bowen illustrated how business practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries failed to meet these standards. By the 1950's, the natural consequences of
this failure was the growth of government regulation seeking to impose legal
obligations on businesses that in Bowen's view had previously been addressed by
business ethics ....
Id. Reflecting on this failure, Bowen wrote: "[S]ince government has become, and will
necessarily continue to be, a partner in all economic affairs, 'the businessperson' is
expected to cooperate with government in the formulation and execution of public
policy." Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 66-67.
48. See Hess, supra note 15 at 70-71. Hess discusses the necessity of outside
auditors verifying a corporation's social report in a similar fashion that a corporation's
financial reports are verified: "An independent and accredited auditor must verify the
social report. This will ensure that the report is a truthful and accurate assessment of
the corporation's performance, and that the appropriate procedures and policies are in
place and are being meaningfully followed." Hess also appropriately addresses the
importance of verification in (re)gaining the public's trust:
Verification will also allay the public's concern that the report is only a public
relations campaign or marketing ploy that exaggerates the company's social
performance and hides less desirable aspects of the company's activities. A self
regulatory body under the supervision of the government should be responsible for
accrediting the independent verifiers. Overall, the verification of social reports would
be similar to the auditing of corporate financial statements, and the lessons learned
there are very applicable to developing a system for accrediting independent verifiers
for social reports.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. See id. at 67. Hess states:
As opposed to a voluntary report, where firms can choose to file a report only when
they are proud of their conduct, an annual report forces a firm to present a complete
picture of its behavior. A social report is not intended to be a one-time 'snapshot' of a
firm, but to provide a means for the company and the public to measure the
company's progress over time towards meeting the demands society places on it.
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arguments against increased disclosure. °  Though, in terms of
apprehensions regarding time consuming collection of new data,
disclosing information on compliance with anti-discrimination laws, for
example, requires some steps that corporations are currently taking."
Finally, viewed through the prism of CSR, advocates of a progressive
perspective argue that the long-term effects and benefits of transparent
and accountable social reporting would offset any extra costs for
collating and disclosing this information.52 Given that US corporations
were originally chartered in the interests of the public good, perhaps the
most credible argument is "that the benefits accruing to society from a
social reporting requirement would certainly justify these costs. 53
B. Predominant and Progressive Perspectives Converge to Support
Increased Transparency and Accountability
In an idealistic sense, it is nice to posit and believe in Friedman's
oft-cited quote: "there is one and only one social responsibility of
Id. Hess further goes on to state the substantive utility and necessity of mandatory
social reporting:
The mandatory requirement also allows corporations and the public to compare the
social performance of all corporations, and to make that comparison on the basis of
industry, geographic region, or any other desired categorization. In addition to
providing information on any specific company's social performance, the regular
publication of the reports facilitates the transfer of information between firms, and to
the public generally, regarding solutions to various social problems. Information on
the process of conducting a social report can also be transferred through the reports
themselves, and thereby improve the quality of the reports.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See id. at 80-81.
51. See id. ("[A] substantial amount of the work necessary to complete the social
report is already being done by many corporations. Corporations are already required
by law to collect some of the information, such as OSHA reports and EEOC reports.").
52. See id. at 81. Hess argues that costs involved in social reporting can be offset
in the following ways:
First, the corporation will benefit from stronger relationships with critical suppliers,
customers, and employees. Second, the corporation will have a better understanding
of any potential legal liability it may face, either from failure to comply with
government regulations or from civil lawsuits .... [e.g., race discrimination]. Third,
the long-term survival and profitability of the company is dependent upon
understanding and meeting the expectations of consumers, as well as other members
of the general public.
Id.
53. See id.
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business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which
is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or
fraud., 54 Those with a laissez-faire conception of corporations, which
corresponds closely with the predominant view, expect corporations to
simply follow this maxim.55 The central problem, however, is that
corporations are managed by humans. Given the current erosion of
public trust in corporate America due to recent corporate scandals, it is
academically irresponsible to argue for a view that fails to adequately
address the transparency and accountability challenges that exists within
U.S. corporations.5 6  Furthermore, as to corporate disclosure of
employment discrimination/diversity practices, the debate over what the
purpose is of a corporation must move beyond the dichotomous choice
between the predominant and progressive views.57 Indeed, when
properly framed, these views actually converge.58
A closer read of Milton Friedman's quote that the responsibilities of
corporate managers are "to conduct the business in accordance with their
54. Friedman, supra note 14, at 17.
55. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 132 (1999) (stating that Friedman's view characterizes a
purely economic perspective of the role of corporations).
56. See Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N.Y.
TmiES, June 6, 2002, at Al (discussing the detrimental effect corporate scandal has had
on the public's regard for business).
57. See Dunfee supra note 55, at 137-40.
58. Id. at 157. While Dunfee acknowledges that the notion that there is no
substantive disagreement between the predominant and progressive viewpoints is a wild
oversimplification, he does suggest that a convergence does exist between these two
views when properly considered:
Managers will more effectively satisfy their primary duty to shareholders when they
respond to signals of significant moral preferences within capital, consumer, and labor
markets relevant to the firm. Managers have a further obligation, based on a social
contract, to act consistently with mandatory marketplace morality and manifest
universal norms.
Id. at 157. See also Cheryl F. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship
Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV.
389 (2002). Wade describes Mehri's work from the perspective of corporate
governance. Id. She discusses corporate disclosures regarding its employment
discrimination/diversity practices as a policy that is both responsive to market forces
and widely held social and ethical norms. Id. Wade describes such a policy as "profit-
maximizing." Id. at 440.
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[shareholder's] desires, which generally will be to make as much money
as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom,"59 reveal the
point of convergence. Though Friedman fails to explicitly consider
ethical rules and their interplay with the law, law and ethical custom are,
in fact, interdependent. 60 However unintentional it may be, Friedman's
recognition of the ethical customs of society and the law as reins on
business self-interest establishes the foundation of the argument that
corporate managers can and should find ways to both cooperate with
widely held social ethical norms and enhance shareholder wealth.6' In
essence, advocates of both predominant and progressive viewpoints of
CSR can find a common ground where efforts to improve information
gathering and reporting are mutually beneficial.
In 1998, under the American chairpersonship of Ira Millstein, The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
advisory group released a report, lending credence to the notion that
shareholder and stakeholder interests can be convergent. 62 Although the
OECD report clearly favors the predominant viewpoint, it also suggests
that a nexus does exist between the predominant and progressive
views.63
59. Friedman, supra note 14, at 12.
60. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 68. Ostas and Loeb explain that:
Law is, at least in part, a function of ethical custom. As customs evolve, the law also
evolves, often with a lag. Law can also change ethical custom. For example, the
desegregation decisions in the mid- 1950s and 1960s helped to change societal norms
regarding the ethics of a segregated society. Both law and ethical custom are ever-
changing systems of social ordering that evolve together and diverge and coincide to
differing degrees in differing contexts.
Id. (citations omitted).
61. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 71-72. Ostas and Loeb explain the confluence
of a progressive viewpoint of CSR and Friedman's narrow viewpoint of CSR stating
that:
Corporate managers should seek creative ways to discover and cooperate with the
social and ethical norms that underlie and inform the public policies governing the
corporation's principle business operations while simultaneously seeking to enhance
firm profitability. This proposition locates the source of a firm's social obligations
while simultaneously limiting the scope of those obligations. It also suggests that
social and economic goals can often be pursued simultaneously.
Id.
62. Peter Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1255,
1263 (1999).
63. See id. at 1263-64; Hess, supra note 15, at 47.
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The OECD Report's chapter headings illustrate this unusually wide
approach:
Chapter 2. Defining the Mission of the Corporation in the Modem
Economy...
Chapter 3. Ensuring Adaptability of Corporate Governance
Arrangements...
Chapter 4. Protecting Shareholder Rights...
Chapter 5. Enabling Active Investing...
Chapter 6. Aligning the Interests of Shareholders and Other
Stakeholders...
Chapter 7. Recognising Societal Interests...
Note that the Report separates 'Aligning the Interests of
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders' from 'Recognising Societal
Interests,' indicating that the authors view the two subjects as separate
issues.65 Much in line with Friedman's dictate that the ethical customs
of society and the law must serve as reins on business self-interest:
66
[T]he OECD advisory group explains its views on the importance of
recognizing societal interests as follows: Companies do not act
independently from the societies in which they operate.
Accordingly, corporate actions must be compatible with societal
objectives concerning social cohesion, individual welfare and equal
opportunities for all. Attending to legitimate social concerns should,
in the long run, benefit all parties, including investors.
6 7
64. Friedman, supra note 14, at 17.
65. See Nobel, supra note 62, at 1264.
66. Friedman, supra note 14, at 12.
67. Nobel, supra note 62, at 1264 (footnote omitted); see also Branson, supra note
41:
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The question then becomes: how best can corporate managers
adjust to such an evolving, conflicting and imprecise set of social and
ethical norms that underlie and inform the corporation's legal
environment, finding creative ways to enhance shareholder wealth in the
face of such uncertainty?6  Corporate managers can institutionalize a
process through which they will be able to survey the social issues
facing the corporation, evaluate the corporation's current practices,
reflect on alternatives, and implement action. 9 What Hess refers to as
"4social reporting" is the mechanism by which corporate managers can
keep abreast of their socio-economic environment by finding creative
In selecting and monitoring their investments, the large activist institutional investors
have placed corporate social responsibility on their agendas. TIAA-CREF,
CALPERS, NYCERS, as well as the labor union pension funds such as the textile
workers.., or the carpenter's union pension funds, have become up front socially
responsible investors. Today according to one authority, there are 144 "socially and
environmentally responsible" mutual funds, with ninety-six billion dollars under
management in 1997.
The growth rate of mutual funds that, while not organized solely around a theme of
social or environmental responsibility, utilize various "social screens" in making
investments, is three times the growth rate of funds generally. Thus "socially
screened" mutual funds' assets grew 227 percent from $162 billion to $529 billion
between 1995 and 1997. Altogether, it is said that "$1.185 trillion of the $13.7 trillion
in funds under professional management in the United States (or about 9%) are
invested using social 'screens' for either products to be avoided (tobacco, alcohol, and
military hardware lead the list) or practices to be encouraged (intelligent
environmental stewardship, for instance)."
Id. at 641-42 (citing Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, at 1267-68 (1999)). See also
Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox, 84 CORNELL L.
REv. 1282 (1999) [hereinafter Corporate Social Responsibility Symposium] (discussing
the growing relevance of CSR in corporate America). Tim Smith states that:
Milton Friedman's maxim that the goal of business is profits for shareholders, and at
least as it was interpreted over the years-that it was the sole goal and all good things
flowed from it-is something that I am not hearing from the top executives, the
CEO's of major corporations, any longer. You hear more. Of course you still will
hear that profitability is key to the long-term success of the company, for
shareholders. But, you also will often hear companies like General Motors talk about
how work on environment and leadership on the environment is good for the bottom
line. And you will hear other companies talk about how being a socially responsible
corporate citizen is not simply a do-good action but it is also good for the shareholders
and the bottom line. So I believe that corporate social responsibility commitments are
being heard more and more from American corporations.
Id. at 1302 (footnote omitted).
68. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 63.
69. Id. at 74.
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ways to maximize the wealth of their shareholders while simultaneously
conforming to legal rules and the ethical customs of society.v
Furthermore, social reporting also serves to increase corporate
transparency and accountability."v The social reporting approach to CSR
proposed in this Article is not merely theoretical-it is a theory currently
in action.72 Both The Body Shop International (The Body Shop), which
is headquartered in the United Kingdom and Ben & Jerry's Homemade,
Inc. (Ben & Jerry's), which is headquartered in the United States have
received widespread publicity regarding their social reports.7 3
70. See Hess, supra note 15, at 63-64. Hess describes the utility of social reporting
as the appropriate gauge by which to measure a corporation's responsiveness to widely
held social ethical norms and by which to asses its' long term economic success:
[A social report] provides measures of how well an organization lives up to the shared
values [created jointly with its stakeholders] to which it has committed itself. It
contributes to a dialogue process where values become integrated into the
organization. It provides an extensive picture of the organization's relationships with
its stakeholders, and thus of its chances for long-term development and survival. But
it encompasses more than just a snapshot at a particular time; its design, development
and interpretation contribute to an ongoing dialogue culture where values become
vital for the organization's self-reference.
Id. at 64 (quoting Peter Pruzan, The Ethical Dimensions of Banking: Sbn Bank,
Denmark, in BUILDING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrrY 12 (Simon Zadek et al. eds.,
1997), at 63, 67). Though the details of constructing a social report in the employment
context regarding compliance with anti-discrimination laws is discussed later in this
Article, Hess notes that social reports generally correspond with both the predominant
and progressive viewpoints:
[B]y promoting: (1) improved and informed corporate decisions with full
understanding of the implications of any action; (2) accountability to the public
through disclosure; (3) an understanding of community and stakeholder expectation of
business and of the evolution of those expectations; and (4) a measurement of
progress towards meeting those expectations. Overall, such a system will allow
corporations to pursue their profit objective, but in a manner that is responsive to the
expectations of society.
Id. at 63.
71. See discussion supra note 48 (discussing the necessity and utility of social
reports being mandated by new legislation); see also discussion supra note 49
(discussing the importance of transparency and accountability in stipulating that outside
auditors must verify corporate social reports, much like the "auditing of corporate
financial statements ... ").
72. See Hess, supra note 15, at 72; see generally id. at 47-48 (debating whether or
not it is time to legislate corporate social report and noting that social reporting, itself, is
not a new idea).
73. Id. at 72.
The Body Shop is a retailer and franchiser in the health and beauty aids industry. In
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The question that remains from the CSR approach adopted in this
Article "is whether resources spent to address social issues enhance or
detract from the [corporation's] traditional performance measures such
as profitability, market share, and stock price." 74 To ask the question
from the predominant viewpoint: does this utilization of CSR positively
affect the corporation's bottom line?75 "A recent article surveyed the
empirical evidence, identifying fifty-one studies that had tested for a
correlation between a corporation's social performance and the
[corporation's] financial performance.76 Although the results of these
studies are mixed, the authors of the review report 'good news',
observing that 'the largest number of researchers has found a positive
relationship. "77
Finally,
From a corporate strategy perspective, the costs of creating a social
report may not be considered costs at all, but rather an investment
with returns paid in several different forms. First, the corporation
1995, The Body Shop had total retail sales of $800 million from over 1200 stores
worldwide. The company employed over 3300 persons in 1995 and its 572
independent franchisees employed several thousand more persons. Beginning in
1992, The Body Shop began publishing independently verified environmental
statements. In 1995, The Body Shop published its first social report, entitled The
Values Report 1995. As a supplement to this internal evaluation, Kirk Hanson, a
senior lecturer at the Stanford School of Business, conducted an independent
evaluation of the company during 1994 and 1995.
1d. (footnotes omitted).
Ben & Jerry's is a premium ice cream maker and ice cream parlor chain. It is a public
corporation with annual sales around $165 million. The company employs
approximately 700 people and has three plants and 130 parlors, which are primarily in
the United States. Ben & Jerry's has conducted some type of social report since 1988.
These social reports began as analyses issued by independent reviewers and then
gradually moved to their current form, an externally-verified internal audit. The
current approach is not just the assessment of the company from an outsider's
perspective, but an attempt to develop standards against which the company can
measure itself.
Id. at 77 (footnotes omitted). For updates on each company, go to
http://www.benjerry.com and http://www.thebodyshop.com (last visited Dec. 29, 2003).
74. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 74.
75. Id.
76. Jennifer J. Griffin & John F. Mahon, The Corporate Social Performance and
Corporate Financial Performance Debate: Twenty-Five years of Incomparable
Research, 36 Bus. & Soc'Y 5, 6-7 (1997).
77. Id. at 6.
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will benefit from stronger relationships with critical suppliers,
customers, and employees. Second, the corporation will have a
better understanding of any potential legal liability it may face, either
from failure to comply with government regulations or from civil
lawsuits (e.g., sexual harassment). Third, the long-term survival and
profitability of the company is dependent upon understanding and
meeting the expectations of consumers, as well as other members of
the general public.
78
The viewpoint expressed in this Article does not call for corporate
managers to sacrifice the long-term economic interests of the
corporation. 79 "Rather, it suggests that inquiring into and cooperating
with the ethical norms [of society] can often enhance those [long term
economic] interests..." 80 while simultaneously enhancing corporate
transparency and accountability.
II. INFORMATION GATHERING AND REPORTING OF COMPANY FINANCIAL
DATA
A. SEC Financial Disclosure Requirements
In the area of securities regulation, Congress has long encouraged
companies to develop procedures for information gathering and
reporting that promote stable securities markets.8' Stable securities
markets are possible only when shareholders have accurate information
available to make decisions about the worth of a particular company, in
light of its operations in a variety of areas, especially the area of
finance.82 Under the Securities Act of 1934,83 Congress delegated
authority to regulate securities trading to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).84 The SEC (1) administers a process that registers
78. See Hess, supra note 15 at 81.
79. Ostas & Loeb, supra note 12, at 76.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Don More, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Argument Against
Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 433, 440-44.
82. See JoErin O'Leary, Recent Decisions, 33 DuQ. L. REv. 1053, 1060 (1995).
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2003).
84. See generally id.
2004] USE OF DIVERSITY REPORT CARDS
actors in the financial services industry, such as brokers and dealers,85
(2) collects periodic reports publicly traded companies must file,86 and
(3) establishes procedures and actions that prevent and respond to fraud
and market manipulation.87
With regard to periodic reporting, it is important to note that the
SEC's overriding goal in requiring publicly traded companies to submit
registration statements and periodic reports is to require them to disclose
all material facts about their activities so investors can decide for
themselves where to invest.88 In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc."g, the
United States Supreme Court defined the materiality standard.9"
Material information is information which "a reasonable investor would
find significant in making an investment decision."9' Examples of
information that meets the materiality standard include: 92 (1) selected
85. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.1 (2d ed.
2002).
86. Id. § 9.3.
87. Id.
88. See id. § 9.2.
89. 426 U.S. 438 (1976), cited in I HAZEN, supra note 85, § 9.6.
90. 1 HAZEN, supra note 85, § 7.5.
91. Id. § 7.5. Companies must disclose:
(1) the organization, capitalization and nature of the business; (2) the terms, rights and
privileges of all classes of outstanding securities; (3) the terms of any securities
offered by the issuer within the preceding three years; (4) the names of all of the
issuer's officers, directors, underwriters and holders of more than ten percent of any
class of equity security of the issuer; (5) compensation of employees other than
officers and directors that exceeds sixty thousand dollars per year in cash; (6)
description of employee bonus and profit sharing plans; (7) description of
management and service contracts; (8) description of options that exist or are to be
created with regard to the issuer's securities; (9) all material contracts made by the
issuer in the past two years or which are to be executed in whole or in part after the
filing and that are outside of the ordinary course of the issuer's business; (10) balance
sheets for not more than the three preceding years to be certified as required by the
Commission; (11) profit and loss statements for the same period; (12) such further
financial statements as the SEC deems necessary for investor protection; and (13)
copies of the articles of incorporation or other organizing documents as well as any
material contracts to which the issuer is a party as the Commission may require.
Id. § 9.2.
92. E.g., Progress Software Corporation, Form 10K, Commission File Number: 0-
19417, For the Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2002 (mandatory 10K filing includes
material disclosures), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/876167/000095013503001256/b45503psel Ovk
.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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financial data, such as information about revenue, worth of investments,
and long-term debt; (2) information about pending legal action that
could affect a company's financial position; (3) analysis of strategic
decisions, such as changes in product development investments;
(4) disclosures about market risk, such as information about competitors;
(5) information about who owns company securities; and (6) financial
statements, such as balance sheets and statements about cash flow.
93
Two sections of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act are especially
relevant to the Diversity Report Card we advocate in Section III of this
Article.94 Both sections relate to information gathering and reporting-
Sections 13(a) and Section 14(a). 9' Section 13(a) of the 1934 Exchange
Act is the provision that requires companies to engage in periodic
disclosure and reporting.96 Companies must file annual (form 10K) and
quarterly (form 10Q) reports to provide information that will give
investors the updated information they need to make informed
investment decisions.97 It is especially important that investors are
aware of a corporation's true financial conditions.98 Knowledgeable
investors can devote resources to what they perceive to be the most
meritorious companies. 99  Periodic reporting requirements have the
added benefit of alerting a company's directors and senior managers to
problems they must address.100 In theory, the reports allow companies to
monitor themselves.1 ' Companies that present themselves to outsiders
in a forthright manner'02 also experience long-term benefits, in that they
see their operations in an accurate light, then have the opportunity to
93. Id.
94. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (2003); see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 85, § 9.3.
95. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78n (2003); see also I HAZEN, supra note 85, § 9.2.
96. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m (2003); see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 85, § 9.3..
97. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.10-K, 249.10-Q (2004); see also I HAZEN, supra note 85,
§ 9.3.
98. Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When it Comes to Auditing? 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 57, 106 (2002).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. at 63.
102. Id. at 107. Bartholomew proposes that the SEC should authorize exchanges to
employ public auditors for listed corporations to better regulation of post-Sarbanes-
Oxley audit committees, arguing this will lead to more honest accounting. Id.; see also
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2003).
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engage in proactive rather than defensive actions to correct problems
internally.' O3
Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is also relevant
to the proposal we present in Section 111.104 When Congress passed
Section 14, its intent was to end corporate fraud that occurred when
management solicited proxies without letting shareholders know the
nature of matters investors would vote on at shareholder meetings. 10 5
Section 14 outlines how voting will take place on issues such as election
of directors, and whether to pass particular shareholder proposals.1
0 6
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act outlines proxy rules that
aim to "provide full disclosure of to investors of matters likely to be
considered at shareholder meetings."'
0 7
The concept of materiality under the proxy rules is the same as it is
for periodic reporting, e.g., the test is whether reasonable investors
would consider a fact significant when making an investment
decision.'0 8 It is important to note that the concept of materiality is
woven through many sections of securities laws.'0 9 It is also important to
point out that the SEC generally interprets the concept to mean "matters
that have affected, or will affect, a company's profitability and financial
outlook.,, 0
103. Bartholomew, supra note 98, at 104.
104. Compare generally 1 HAZEN, supra note 85, § 11.1 (discussing how the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and proxy rules are intended to assure full disclosure)
with infra Part III. See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2003).
105. 1 HAZEN, supra note 85, § 11.2.
106. See id. § 11.6; cf id. § 11.2 (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission's
argument that Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to ensure "fair
shareholder suffrage.").
107. Id. § 11.1. This section "empowers the SEC to require proxy disclosure as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U.S.C.A. § 78n(a) 2000.
108. See id. § 11.4; see also id. § 7.5 (discussing materiality and disclosure with
regard to Securities Act of 1933 registration statements and Securities Act of 1934
filings).
109. Id. at 133; see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a (2003). Securities Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (1934).
110. Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1433-34.
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B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
We now know that SEC requirements under a number of
provisions, including those outlined above regarding periodic reporting
and proxy rules, have not always yielded the kind of behavior society
hopes for corporations to live up to."' Given the SEC's focus on
ensuring that investors have access to accurate financial information, it
is not surprising that many of Congress's post-Enron reforms relate
directly to ensuring that investors have access to accurate financial
data."' On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter the "Act") on July 30, 2002.13 The Act,
which is the most comprehensive legislation affecting securities laws
and their administration since the Great Depression, strives to prevent
future scandals and restore investor confidence.' 14 The Act attempts to
actualize these goals by: (1) establishing oversight of the accounting
profession; (2) enhancing the independence of accounting firms; (3)
fostering greater independence of the audit committee of a company's
board of directors and, likewise, (4) of the auditors themselves; (5)
ensuring greater accountability among corporate directors and (6) calls
for specific regulations as a response to the particular ethical lapses
evidenced by recent corporate scandals.'
To address the virtual non-existence of outside and independent
regulation of accounting firms, the Act establishes the Oversight Board
(hereinafter, "Board"), which will "oversee the audit of public
companies, ' 16 "establish standards for auditors, ... conduct inspections
of public accounting firms ' 17 and can "impose sanctions ... such as
suspension from accounting activities on an accountant or accounting
firm for non-compliance with the Act.""' The Board will consist of five
individuals, two of which are required to be or have been certified public
111. Brian Kim, Recent Development: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARv. J. LEGIS. 235,
238 (2003) (discussing how Enron's compliance with the then-existing SEC provisions
still led to its collapse and deceit of the public).
112. Id.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
114. See generally Kim supra note 111.
115. Id. at 235 (listing some of the changes initiated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 10 1(a).
117. Id. § 104(a).
118. Kim, supranote 111, at 241.
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accountants." 9 These Board members are obliged to have a
"demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the
public."
' 120
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for
the organization and oversight of the Board.'2 ' The SEC is required to
approve all Board-proposed rules, may "censure or impose limitations
upon the.., operations of the Board,"'122 "if it finds that the Oversight
Board has violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the securities laws, or if
the Oversight Board has failed to ensure the compliance of accounting
firms without reasonable justification or excuse."' 123 Furthermore, the
SEC may remove any member from or censure any member of the
Board for failing to enforce the Act and/or the securities laws. 24 "The
SEC can also enhance or reduce the Oversight Board's sanctions if the
[SEC] finds them inadequate or excessive."'' 25  Through such
unprecedented legislation, the Board promises to have progressive and
far-reaching effects on the transparency and accountability of the
accounting profession. 2 6 All of these measures designed to improve
information gathering and reporting demonstrates legislators' desire to
protect the workings of financial markets, which rely on honesty in
reporting.
7
The Act also seeks to augment the quality and independence of an
audit by imbuing the audit committee of a company's board of directors
with more authority regarding and responsibility for the audit.2 8 The Act
makes it clear that it seeks to untangle the conflicts of interests that had
become defining features of recent corporate scandals by "break[ing] the
traditional ties between the company's outside accountants and company
management by making the audit committee responsible for the
119. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(2).
120. Id. § 101(e)(1).
121. Id. § 107(a).
122. Id. § 107(d)(2).
123. Kim, supra note 111, at 241-42.
124. Id. at 242.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 236.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 242-43.
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company's relationship with outside accountants."'' 9 Under the Act, the
audit committee is responsible for hiring and receiving reports from the
company's outside accounting firm, and it will be responsible for the
work-product and payment of the firm. 3 0 Furthermore, the Act provides
that each audit committee member "must be 'independent,' which under
the Act means that he or she cannot, other than in his or her capacity as a
member of the audit committee, the board or any other board committee,
(1) accept any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fees from the
company or (2) be an 'affiliated person of the issuer' or any of its
subsidiaries."'' To further disentangle conflicts of interests, the Act
mandates "that if a company's CEO, Controller, CFO, or Chief
Accounting Officer was employed by the company's outside accounting
firm during a one-year period preceding the audit, that auditing firm has
a conflict and is not independent."' 3 2 Such measures are hoped to
prevent the ties between the executive officers of corporations and their
accounting firms from leading to "biased audits overlooking ethically
questionable or outright illegal activities.' 33
The Act's prohibition of public accounting firms from providing
non-audit functions conjointly with any audit is another way in which
the Act strengthens the independence of accountants.134 "Non-audit
services not explicitly prohibited - such as tax services - must be
approved by the audit committee in advance.. .Any preapproval of non-
audit services must be disclosed in periodic reports filed with the
[SEC].' 35 Auditors are also required to "report to the audit committee
with respect to critical accounting policies, alternative treatments of
financial information under generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP") that have been discussed with management and any other
material written communications with management. In addition, the Act
requires that filings include all material adjustments that have been
129. John J. Huber & Thomas J. Kim, The Response to Enron: The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and Commission Rulemaking, 1343 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAc.
HANDBOOK SERIEs 61, 102 (Nov. 7-9, 2002). Huber & Kim analyze the Act from the
perspective of providing counsel to corporate clients. Id.
130. Kim supra note 111, at 2433.
131. Huber & Kim, supra note 129, at 103.
132. See Kim, supra note 111, at 243.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Huber & Kim, supra note 129, at 113.
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identified by an accounting firm."'3 6 The Act also mandates the rotation
of the audit partner every five years. 37 Essentially, the strengthening of
auditor independence is meant to preempt the occurrence of a
corporation "buying off' its auditor through lucrative "bribes" through
the guise of consulting fees, which prevents a transparent and
accountable financial image of the corporation from emerging.'38
To further enhance corporate accountability, the Act requires the
SEC to implement rules providing for corporate executive certifications
on a quarterly and annual basis. 39 In addition, the Act imposes criminal
liability, which takes the form of a fine of up to $5 million and/or
imprisonment for up to 20 years "for CEOs and CFOs who knowingly
or willfully furnish inaccurate certifications."' 4 Furthermore, "if an
audit firm has to prepare a restatement because of material
noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement, the CEO and
CFO must forfeit any bonus received in the twelve months following the
first public issuance of the financial statement.'
' 4
'
As an accompaniment to the aforementioned certifications
requirement, the Act also mandates an internal control report, which
forces "CEOs not only to certify that they know of no wrongdoing, but
also to take steps to guarantee that if there were any wrongdoing, they
would be likely to know about it.' 142 The report is to also "contain an
assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year, of the
effectiveness of such structure and procedures."' 43 Moreover, "[t]he
[corporation's] outside auditor is required to attest to, and report on, the
internal control assessment made by the management of the
[corporation] in accordance with the standards for attestation
engagements adopted by the [Board] established under the Act."'" As a
matter of fact, "without accurate internal controls to gather and sort a
136. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 USHERS
SWEEPING CHANGES FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) at 4
[hereinafter SWEEPING CHANGES] (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 5.
138. Kim, supra note 111, at 244.
139. SWEEPING CHANGES, supra note 136, at 2.
140. Id.
141. Kim, supra note 111, at 245.
142. Id. at 247.
143. Huber & Kim, supra note 129, at 98.
144. Id.
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corporation's financial data, no amount of vigilance by outside
accountants can completely correct numbers tainted at the source.' 45
The internal control provision of the Act highlights the unavoidable
centrality of the fiduciary duty of trust in corporate disclosures and the
heavy obligations placed on corporate managers to attest to the veracity
of these disclosures.
As a direct response to the Enron fiasco, several other reforms were
mandated by the Act. During "blackout '1 46 periods, many Enron
employees, by policy, were not allowed to sell company stock, while no
similar rule prevented the corporate executives from doing so.'4 7 The
Act prohibits "any director or executive officer of [a corporation] or any
equity security to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or transfer any
equity security of the [corporation] during any blackout period with
respect to that security if the director or executive officer acquired the
equity security in connection with the service to or employment by the
[corporation]. ' ',48
Another ethical lapse at Enron was off-balance sheet accounts that
were used to hide millions of dollars in losses, thereby creating a false
financial picture of the company that encouraged investors to purchase
Enron stock.149 The Act calls for "the disclosure of all 'off-balance sheet
transactions.., that may have a material current or future effect on
financial condition . .. "'50 This provision seeks to prevent corporations
from misleading potential investors by not reporting losses on their
balance sheets. 5 ' An additional reform that is a response to a specific
unethical corporate behavior is the Act's prohibition of personal loans
from the corporation to its' executives.1 2 "According to media reports,
former Tyco [CEO] Dennis Kozlowski received a $19 million no-
145. Kim, supra note 111, at 247.
146. Id. at 248. Kim defines a "blackout period" as "the time when employers
change pension plan rules or administrators, during which employees cannot access or
sell their retirement accounts." Id.
147. Id.
148. SWEEPING CHANGES, supra note 136, at 15 (citations omitted).
149. Kim, supra note 111, at 248.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 249.
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interest loan from the company that was later forgiven. 53 "The Act's
prohibition on personal loans will help prevent the abuse of corporate
funds for personal purposes."' 5 4 Expansive in scope, the Act seeks to
provide a permanent legislative solution to the problems of recent
corporate scandals and to regain the public trust that is requisite for
greater investment in corporations.'55
C. Social Disclosure
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is expansive in scope, it does not
resolve all key issues related to improved public trust.'56 One issue
Congress and/or the SEC'57 has yet to address is whether the SEC should
demand additional disclosure on social issues, such as environmental,
153. Id. Kim also notes that "Kozlowski received an additional $13 million from
Tyco to pay the income taxes on that loan." Id. Kim goes on to state that such loans to
corporate executives "figured prominently in several other recent corporate scandals."
Id.
154. Id. Kim quotes Senator Schumer discussing the new provision: "CEOs will
have to go to the bank, just like everyone else, to acquire a loan; which, [sic] will
reduce the risk of CEOs ability to use company funds for personal purposes." Id.
155. Huber & Kim, supra note 129, at 1.
156. An additional issue the SEC is just starting to consider is the process by which
members of corporate boards are nominated and selected. Recently, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has proposed a rule designed "to enhance the transparency of
the operation of boards of directors." Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee
Fanctions and Communications between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, 17
C.F.R. pt. 240 (amendments to Items 7 and 22 of schedule 14A under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934) (proposed Aug. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48301.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
Generally, the proposed rules provide greater shareholder access to proxies and foster
greater shareholder participation in important matters of corporate governance. See id.
The proposed rules include a provision that requires disclosure of "the nominating
committee's process for identifying and evaluating nominees for director." Id. We
believe this rule does not go far enough. In particular, we believe the rule should
require disclosures regarding actions taken to establish greater board diversity.
Shareholders are likely to be interested in knowing what policies and procedures a
corporation has enacted to promote race and gender diversity in boards of directors.
157. The SEC's rulemaking power is limited by (1) the original legislation's
statutory mandate and (2) the requirement that any rule the SEC passes bear a
"reasonable relationship" to the purposes underlying this statutory mandate. In addition
to rulemaking power, the SEC makes law by using its prosecutorial power to bring
cases to court. See HAZEN, supra note 85, at 410-11.
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human rights, workplace and consumer safety, and equal employment
opportunity issues.' "[S]ocial information bears primarily on how a
company generates profits, while financial information bears primarily
on whether and to what extent a company generates profit."' 59 In theory,
the question whether the government should insist on disclosure of
information related to social issues draws on many of the themes this
Article addressed in Section I. 6 Scholars who write in favor of what
they call "social disclosure"' 6' agree that, with regard to increased
transparency and accountability, the interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders can be convergent.
162
In the late 1990's, Cynthia A. Williams wrote a groundbreaking
argument in favor of mandatory social disclosure. 63 Williams compared
information gathering and reporting with regard to financial data, with
gathering and reporting data related to social issues. She concentrated
on reforming Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, interpreting this section to
empower the SEC to "require proxy disclosure 'as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
' ''i 64
Williams asserted that "[t]he rise of social activism by investors brought
purely social concerns within the realm of 'materiality' under TSC and
so also within the realm of potentially mandatory proxy disclosure."' 65
She argued that "corporate social behavior can affect profitability,"
hence social disclosure should be mandatory.
66
158. See Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1435.
159. Id. at 1449 (emphasis added). Of course, when a company violates the law in a
way one might call a "social issue," it can incur costs (e.g., criminal fines, civil
settlements) that relate directly to the company's bottom line.
160. See supra notes 12-80 and accompanying text. Discussions of the topic also
raise the same kinds of questions we considered earlier in the piece, e.g., the rights and
roles of outsiders in finding out what is going on within a particular company, whether
improved information gathering and reporting should be voluntary or mandated on
behalf of the public, and whether the costs of increased transparency and accountability
outweigh the benefits.
161. See generally Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1435.
162. See id. at 1440 ("The most obvious reason for an investor to desire social
disclosure is that social performance may correlate with profit.").
163. See Williams, supra note 21.
164. Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1435.
165. Id. at 1436.
166. Id.
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Recently, the student staff of the Harvard Law Review 167 expanded
upon Williams' seminal work by agreeing with most of her argument in
favor of mandatory social disclosure, 161 first making a general case for
mandatory rather than voluntary disclosure, then outlining a framework
for deciding the circumstances under which the SEC should require
social disclosure. They made a case for mandatory disclosure by
pointing out that "information is a public good.', 169 The students made
an analogy to a lighthouse as a public good, e.g., "the social benefit...
exceeds [its] social cost but no private actor has an incentive to provide
[it]. '"7  Similarly, "information may have a net social benefit, yet
individuals may lack the personal incentive to generate it."' 7 ' They also
explained that there is sometimes a conflict between managers and
shareholders. Managers may not give information voluntarily when
doing so complicates their lives by adding to the list of outcomes they
are accountable for.'72 Finally, the student authors pointed out that
"third-party effects may lead to a sub-optimal disclosure levels."'
' 73
Individual firms may have no incentive to provide certain kinds of
information, even though investors may want it.174 For instance, makers
of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are unlikely to compete with other
makers by highlighting safety features because doing so may highlight
the dangerous nature of all SUVs, even the "safer" ones. 75 Similarly, if
one company points out that it is doing particularly well in an area of
167. At Harvard, student notes are written collaboratively, so no one student's name
appears on the notes. In this Article, we refer to the Harvard law review staff as the
Harvard students, the students, and the student authors. Our Article evaluates the
Harvard students' work because it considers disclosure of social information related to
our own work in the field of employment discrimination. Williams, by contrast, applies
her theories to social issues related to globalization. See Era of Economic Globalization,
supra note 16.
168. See Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1435. The students took issue
with Williams' "free-floating" mandate for corporate disclosure and instead advocated a
"mandate bounded by considerations of investor welfare and underpinned by the same
economic logic that supports mandatory financial disclosure. Id.
169. Id. at 1446.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1447
172. See id. at 1449.
173. Id. at 1448.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1450.
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concern to social activists (e.g., whether companies are complying with
environmental laws), this disclosure may call attention to an industry's
generally weak record in this area.
After making a case for mandatory disclosure in general, The
Harvard students outlined four factors they believe the SEC should
consider when deciding whether disclosure should be mandatory:
(1) whether and how important the information is to investors;
76
(2) whether the direct costs of disclosure would be low, e.g., costs are
lower if the company is already collecting the relevant information; 11
(3) whether, there are indirect costs associated with disclosure levels,
e.g., costs as "effects on activity levels;"'' 7' and (4) whether there are
third-party effects associated with the information.
179
The Harvard students applied their four criteria to one social issue,
equal employment opportunity.' 80 First, the students provided evidence
that investors care about equal employment opportunity and want
information about a firm's performance in this area.' 8 ' They explained
social trends toward "vibrant social activism on social issues.' ' 1 82 The
students then highlighted the number of shareholder proposals seeking
corporate disclosure of information related to equal opportunity
performance.' 83 They also offered information about the number of
mutual funds that screen companies for equal employment opportunity
performance. 84  With regard to the second criterion that focuses on
176. The students reminded the reader of the SEC's goals of "protecting and
empowering investors." Id. at 1450.
177. Id. at 1451 (stating that "mandatory social disclosure would be quite cheap if
the data to be disclosed were already regularly collected.").
178. Id. at 1451. A firm may alter profitable behavior (e.g., violating environmental
laws), which had been beneficial to the company but a social cost to investors. See id. at
1452 (stating that "[n]et indirect costs of disclosure will be low if the behavior curtailed
does not contribute greatly to costs and if investors derive significant disutility from
such behavior.").
179. Id. at 1452 (stating that "indirect costs will be lowest in situations in which the
information has significant, secrecy-inducing third-party benefits, for it is precisely in
these situations that firms will find it rational to hoard information despite the collective
contrary interests of their investors.").
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1452.
182. Id. at 1443.
183. Id. at 1452-53.
184. Id. at 1453.
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direct costs, the students observed that companies are already collecting
information about equal employment opportunity, so "an SEC-
administered mandatory disclosure requirement would have little direct
cost.
185
The students then turned to their third criterion, which focuses on
indirect costs associated with social disclosures. 8 6  The relevant
questions are whether companies benefit from discriminating and
whether investors suffer a social cost from this discrimination.'8 7 The
students had proposed earlier in their argument that "the net indirect
costs of disclosure will be low if the behavior curtailed does not
contribute greatly to costs and if investors derive significant disutility
from such behavior."' 8  In applying this proposition to equal
opportunity information, the students considered two theories of
discrimination.8 9 The reader can infer that their first theory relates to
intentional discrimination.' 90  The students explained that some
employers discriminate because they are acting on investors' "taste" for
discrimination,' 9' e.g., that may be what investors want. The students
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1451.
187. Id.
188. See discussion, supra note 178.
189. See Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1453.
190. See id. The students' theories include first, a taste for discrimination by
investors, where failure to meet these tastes result in costs. See id. Second, statistical
discrimination may occur. Id. This happens because the employer may be using
membership in a group "as a proxy for characteristics that are legitimate employment
qualifications." Id.
191. Id. at 1452.
It is likely that students described discrimination using terms such as taste and
statistical discrimination because their analysis is based upon economic theory and
conservative economists describe discrimination using these terms. See, e.g., GARY S.
BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996). Becker, a Nobel prize-winning conservative
economist, bases much of his economic analysis on the assumption that "[p]references
or tastes play a crucial part in virtually all fields of study in economics and other social
sciences..." Id. at 3. He presents his economic way of looking at life, covering a wide
range of topics, from marriage, to crime, to discrimination. Id. at 233 (marriage), 143
(crime), 140 (discrimination). When he describes discrimination, he writes about it
using terms the Harvard students used, e.g., tastes and statistical discrimination. Id. at
141. For example, he writes that, "[p]resumably, the amount of observable
discrimination against minorities in wages and employment depends not only on tastes
for discrimination, but also on other variables, such as the degree of competition and
2004]
426 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
then wrote that the average investor presumably has distaste for
discrimination.192 Thus, "the benefit to the egalitarians would likely
swamp the cost to the discriminators, and investors as a whole would
benefit."' 93
The students also considered a second theory of discrimination,
"statistical discrimination."' 94  This concept apparently relates to
discrimination that is neutral in intent. 195 The students then described
employers who sometimes discriminate by using group membership
(e.g., race) as a proxy for considering characteristics that are related to
civil rights legislation." Id. at 141. Later, in describing discrimination, he uses the
phrase "statistical discrimination," which refers to stereotyped reasoning of employers
that minorities are less productive. Id. at 142. Becker says that these beliefs can be self-
fulfilling, causing minorities to invest less in their human capital, hence making them
less productive. Id.
We believe the students' analysis of discrimination would have been stronger if they
had considered alternative perspectives on discrimination. See, e.g., RANDY ALBELDA
ET AL., UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELDS: UNDERSTANDING WAGE INEQUALITY AND
DISCRIMINATION (2001) [hereinafter UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELDS]. Albelda contrasts
neoclassical economic theories about discrimination with theories developed by
political economists. See id. at 4-8. Becker's emphasis on individual "tastes" for
discrimination is consistent with neoclassical economic theory. Albelda points out that
neoclassical economic theory assumes individuals are rational, self-interest calculators
who always determine the costs and benefits associated with a decision. See UNLEVEL
PLAYING FIELDS, at 121. Additionally, neoclassical economic theory assumes that
individuals have perfect information; an individual's tastes and preferences are based
upon this information. Id. at 6, 43. By contrast, when political economists look at wage
disparities, they ask questions about unequal economic power. See UNLEVEL PLAYING
FIELDS, at 121. In particular, they consider a person's membership in a particular group
and how this group will affect a person's ability to "get a fair shot in the labor market or
elsewhere the economy." See id. at 121. Political economists assume that when we are
bom we are not born into a world that is fair, rather, our economy is "an unlevel playing
field." See id. at 121. No matter how much we invest in our human capital through
experience, education and training, we will have unequal outcomes because "the teams
do not have equal resources and the rules of the game favor some over others." Id.
192. Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1453.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1454.
195. Id. ("Statistical discrimination can occur in the absence of any antipathy toward
a... group.") (quoting David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standard, 79 GEO. L. J. 1619,
1621 (1991)).
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employment qualifications. 96 The students then discussed employers'
desire to reduce employee search costs. 97 Part of this analysis of the
third criterion was difficult to understand. It helps to read the analysis in
the context of an earlier passage, where the students wrote that, with
regard to social issues, investors may see a social problem (e.g.,
discrimination) as a cost, even if the company sees it as a benefit (e.g.,
the company may save money by violating the law).' 98 Investors are
likely to want to sacrifice some amount of profits if the profits are
derived from behavior they find objectionable.'99
Finally, the students considered their last criterion, which focuses
on third-party effects. 20 The students argued that disclosure should be
mandatory in situations in which a particular company could benefit
from keeping its own data secret, despite investors' collective
interests.20' They asserted that firms are unlikely to collect and disclose
equal employment opportunity data voluntarily because "of the fear that
disclosure will lead to a competitive disadvantage. 2 2  The students
explained that even those companies with the best performance are
unlikely to volunteer the information because the slogan "We
Discriminate Less" is not good marketing. 3
The students concluded their analysis of the four criteria by writing,
"equal employment opportunity data are a plausible candidate for
mandatory disclosure under a regime that is designed to serve the overall
interests of investors, not merely their financial interests.''
We agree with the students' general approach for outlining the
circumstances under which the SEC should require mandatory social
disclosure. Although we are advocating mandatory social disclosure
under Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act, we believe the SEC could use the
196. Id. at 1454.
197. Although this part of the students' analysis was intuitively correct, it was
incomplete.
198. Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1451.
199. Id. ("[I]t is a fair guess that most investors would consider the sacrifice of a
profit earned on the backs of an enslaved workforce to be a net profit.").
200. Id. at 1448 (describing third-party effects).
201. Id. at 1452.
202. Id. at 1454.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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same set of criteria as those outlined for Section 14(a).°s Using the
same criteria is consistent with the fact that materiality is interpreted the
same way under more than one provision of the Act. Although we agree
with the students' general approach, we question some of the students'
analysis. Although we ultimately agree with the students' conclusion-
that the SEC should require social disclosure of equal employment
opportunity data-our analysis is somewhat different, especially with
regard to the students' third and fourth criteria, which focus on indirect
costs associated with social disclosure and third-party effects of
disclosure. Before we comment on the students' analysis, though, we
must present more detailed information about the precise nature of equal
employment opportunity data as a social issue.
Many lawyers are using their skills to work toward increased racial
and gender equality.20 6 In the next section we highlight four specific
205. HAZEN, supra note 85, at 440-45 (describing disclosure requirements and their
application under § 14(a)).
206. See, e.g., Chuck Salter, The Next Big (Legal) Thing, FAST Co., Apr. 2003, at
112. Salter describes in detail the work of Brad Seligman, an attorney who led the
charge against Wal-Mart based upon Wal-Mart's allegedly discriminatory treatment of
women. See id. In particular, the class action lawsuit Seligman has filed against the
company alleges discrimination in pay and promotions. Id. The suit, Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, is the largest employment discrimination case ever filed. Id. at 114.
Seligman seeks to represent over 700,000 current and former female employees. Id.
Salter also describes Cyrus Mehri's work. See Chuck Salter, A Reformer Who Means
Business, FAST Co., Apr. 2003, at 102.
For additional articles about class action lawsuits alleging systemic discrimination, see
Kate Darby Rauch, Lawsuit Plaintiffs 'Wonder Boys' Help fill Needs of Those Who
Want, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 21, 2002, at A6. This article describes the lawsuit
brought by Angela Alioto against international bakery chain Interstate Brands Corp. for
race discrimination. Id. A jury awarded plaintiffs $120 million for discrimination with
regard to promotions and jobs. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged a racially hostile
environment. Ultimately, the case settled out of court for $20 million. Id.; see also Cliff
Hocker, Equality in the Workplace, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 22. This
article describes class action job-bias lawsuits plaintiffs brought against both NASA
flight centers in Maryland and Virginia and the Social Security Administration by black
employees. Id. In 2002, NASA engineers and scientists won a $3.75 million settlement.
In the same year, black male employees at the Social Security Administration won a
$7.75 million settlement after alleging denials of promotions based upon race. Id.; see
also Janet Wiscombe, Corporate America's Scariest Opponent, WORKFORCE, Apr. 1,
2003, at 34, 38 [hereinafter Scariest Opponent]. This article describes multi-million
dollar discrimination cases, including the Interstate Brands and Social Security
Administration race discrimination cases. Id.; see also David Aronson, Managing the
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cases-not because they are the only compelling systemic
discrimination cases, but rather because we have direct knowledge of the
issues and facts in these cases,207 and this knowledge will ultimately
allow us to return to the Harvard students' analysis of indirect costs
(criterion three) and third-party effects (criterion four) of social
disclosure. First, however, Section III describes legal challenges to
human resources policies.
III. INFORMATION GATHERING AND REPORTING OF WORKFORCE
DIVERSITY DATA
A. Legal Challenges to Human Resources Policies
The lawsuits against Texaco, The Coca-Cola Company, Johnson &
Johnson and BellSouth have brought to the public's attention allegedly
illegal corporate behavior-allegations that corporations were or are
engaging in widespread race discrimination in the areas of pay,
performance evaluations, and promotions. These cases, when
considered as a set, provide clear information about (1) areas of
weaknesses many companies demonstrate in the employment
Diversity Revolution: Best Practices for 21st Century Business, Civ. RTS. J. (2002), at
46, 50 [hereinafter Diversity Best Practices]. This article summarizes a number of
lawsuits filed against corporations for race and gender discrimination, including those
filed against Shone's, Home Depot, Publix, Denny's, and South Carolina Edison. Id.
The article also lists the Coca-Cola and Texaco cases. Id.
207. Cyrus Mehri represented or currently represents the plaintiffs in the four cases
we highlighted in the next section. Class counsel in Roberts v. Texaco Inc. were Cyrus
Mehri and Michael Hausfeld (Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C.) and Daniel
L. Berger, Max W. Berger and Steven B. Singer (Bemstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP). Class counsel in Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Company were Jeffrey C.
Bramlett and Josh Thorpe (Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, L.L.P.) and Cyrus Mehri and
Pamela Coukos (Mehri & Skalet, P.L.L.C.).
Lead Plaintiffs' counsel in Gutierrez v. Johnson are Cyrus Mehri and Pamela Coukos
(Mehri & Skalet, P.L.L.C.), Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. (The Cochran Firm), Bennet D.
Zurofsky (Reitman Parsonnet, P.C.), and Bruce Ludwig (Sheller, Ludwig & Badey,
P.C.). Lead plaintiffs' counsel in Jenkins v Bellsouth Corp. are Joseph M. Sellers and
Christine E. Webber (Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C.), Cyrus Mehri and
Gouri Bhat (Mehri & Skalet, P.L.L.C.), Johnnie L. Cochran (Cochran, Cherry, Givens,
Smith & Montgomery), and Byron R. Perkins (Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis,
P.C.).
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discrimination/diversity arena, (2) the kinds of information proactive
companies should gather and report for the benefit of all stakeholders,
and (3) concrete action steps companies can take to remedy problems
and avoid the costs of litigation. As the next paragraphs describe the
four class action lawsuits, notice the overlapping themes of widespread,
institutionalized 20 8 discrimination that either went unnoticed by key
decision makers, or was noticed, but ignored.20 9 All four cases highlight
the need for improved information gathering and reporting.
Roberts vs. Texaco Inc.210 was one of the first glass ceiling2 1' cases
alleging systemic race discrimination at a Fortune 500 company. In this
case, the plaintiffs brought to light several problems with the company's
human resources policies and procedures. For instance, they uncovered
a secret high-potential list, which served as the basis for promotion
decisions.212 Furthermore, plaintiffs hired a statistician, who gathered
208. M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The
Glass Ceiling, The Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side,
HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Many Paths to Justice]. The
authors explain that when discrimination is institutionalized, it is both historical and
ongoing. Unlike individual discrimination, which involves intent and inappropriate
behavior by specific people, institutionalized discrimination is difficult to see in
everyday practices. See id.
209. See Complaint, Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, at 6-7, available at
http://www.findjustice.com/ms/cases/j-and-j/complaint/ll1-15-2001.PDF (claiming the
company demonstrated reckless indifference to allegations of race discrimination) (last
visited Dec. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Gutierrez Complaint]; see Complaint, Jenkins v. Bell
South Adver. & Publ'g Co., at 2-3 (claiming that the company knowingly administered
discriminatory employee testing), available at
http://www.findjustice.com/ms/cases/bellsouth/complaint-final.PDF (last visited Dec.
29, 2003) [hereinafter Jenkins Complaint].
210. This case settled in 1996 for $176.1 million. Thomas Mulligan & Chris Kraul,
Texaco Settles Race Bias Suit for $176 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at A-1.
211. A glass ceiling is a metaphor that describes hidden barriers that prevent
individuals or groups from advancing upward in their organizations into high-level
managerial positions. See Many Paths to Justice, supra note 208. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the importance of eliminating glass ceilings. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003) (reasoning that "[i]n order to cultivate a set
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity.").
212. See BARI-ELLEN ROBERTS & JACK E. WHITE, ROBERTS VS. TEXACO: A TRUE
STORY OF RACE & CORPORATE AMERICA 145 (1998) [hereinafter ROBERTS VS.
TEXACO].
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and reported to plaintiffs evidence of systemic race discrimination in the
company's compensation system. 21 3  Another significant problem
plaintiffs discovered was that the company's performance appraisal
system gave managers too much discretion, and too often managers did
not use this discretion in a legally sound way.21 4
Two additional facts are worth highlighting. One is that Texaco's
culture condoned even blatant racist slurs.2 5 A second, related concern
is that the company lacked a fair process that allowed employees to offer
complaints and suggestions internally. For instance, when a team of
managers engaged in benchmarking and offered suggestions to the
company about how it might manage diversity more effectively, 216 the
213. See generally id. at 209, 212, 215, 230 (noting that plaintiffs hired a statistician
who analyzed data that plaintiffs were able to gather during the discovery process).
214. See id. at 162-63 (describing how Robert's performance evaluation rating was
lowered at the request of management on the basis that she had been "uppity").
215. After filing a class complaint, attorneys seeking to represent the class use
formal discovery procedures to collect evidence in support of an eventual motion for
class certification. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 & 26. As part of the discovery process,
attorneys obtain documents and computerized human resources data from the
defendant. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26. They also deposed key company representatives in
an effort to show that the company's employment practices are class wide in scope and
discriminatory in effect. Id. Additionally, attorneys gather evidence from potential
class members. Id. Potential class members provide anecdotal evidence of
discrimination by sharing their stories with attorneys. In Texaco, attorneys gathered a
significant amount of evidence about discrimination, including anecdotes that support
plaintiffs' assertion that the company condoned blatant racist slurs. ROBERTS VS.
TEXACO, supra note 212, at 243. Potential class members recounted stories in which
white employees threatened, taunted, and harassed black employees. Id. at 243-44. A
company vice president came to a company-sponsored Halloween party dressed as a
black Sambo. Id. at 242. A Texaco manager advised another manager to "fire [the]
black ass" of an African-American employee who had filed a charge of employment
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. at
243. A white man referred to a black man as "an orangutan." Id. A black employee
had "KKK" painted on the side of his car. Id. at 244. An African-American employee
was called "a nigger, nothing but a nigger." Id. For additional examples, see id. at 206-
08, 242-44; see also Kurt Eichenwald, The Two Faces Of Texaco, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1996, § 3, at I (documenting chronically racist incidents at Texaco) [hereinafter The
Two Faces of Texaco].
216. In 1992, Texaco started a new initiative, Texaco Award for Excellence teams,
known as TAFE teams. ROBERTS VS. TEXACO, supra note 212, at 143. These teams
were supposed to promote innovative ideas within the company. Id. A company
director of human resources invited a small group of employees to provide input about
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human resources executive who listened to the suggestions retaliated
against the managers working to promote change.217 He responded to
the team's somewhat traditional proposals for promoting diversity by
suggesting the proposals were radical.218 Then he had a temper tantrum
in response to the proposals, and yelled at the team that that they were
"Black Panthers."
219
It is important to note that, in this case, plaintiffs' attorneys engaged
in more information gathering and reporting than the company had ever
imagined or planned for themselves. Lawyers for the company knew the
evidence that was mounting against the company, but upper-level
managers and the Board of Directors had no apparent knowledge of the
complete picture of company human resources policies and practices
until the parties were on the verge of settling the lawsuit.
220
Additionally, shareholders had no idea that they had invested in a
company with massive problems in its diversity management system
how the company could succeed with regard to diversity. Id. This small group included
Bari-Ellen Roberts and Sil Chambers, two individuals who eventually became class
representatives in Texaco. Id. The director arranged a meeting with this small group
and his boss, John Ambler. Id. When Roberts and Chambers presented their ideas about
how the company might succeed with regard to diversity, Ambler exploded:
You people must have lost your minds. I think you're a bunch of militants! I've been
here for thirty-three years and I can tell you right now that Texaco will not even
consider any of these proposals! We'll never do any of these things! The next thing
you know we'll have Black Panthers running down the halls, or around the circle in
front of the building! We're not having that here!
Id. at 147-48.
217. See generally ROBERTS VS. TEXACO, supra note 212, at 159-60
218. Id. at 148.
219. Id. Additionally, the company retaliated against Jerry Leaphart, a Texaco
lawyer who made the first attempts to organize employees who were victims of
discrimination. Id. at 176-78. Soon after the company found out Leaphart was
gathering information and calling employees and alert them about his efforts to pull
victims together, the company fired him. Id.
Today's Texaco, now ChevronTexaco, has a much different response to employee
complaints. In re Texaco Task Force on Equality and Fairness, Dkt. No. M-10-469
(Sept. 20. 2002), available at http://www.texaco.com/diversity (last visited Dec. 30,
2003). The company has a problem resolution system that allows employees to voice
concerns. Id. This system includes a confidential hotline. Id. ChevronTexaco attempts
to make sure that employees are not afraid of retaliation. Id. Additionally, the company
has implemented an Ombuds Program, which provides an ombudsperson who hears and
resolves employee complaints. Id.
220. See The Two Faces of Texaco, supra note 215.
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until news of overt discrimination and a cover-up became public 22 ' and
shareholder value plummeted.
The next case added another layer of complexity to the growing
realization that American corporations are experiencing failures in the
area of employment discrimination/diversity. Ingram v. The Coca-Cola
Companyz)22 made it clear that companies with good reputations and
excellent diversity rhetoric suffer from problems just like those at
Texaco. In Ingram, plaintiffs alleged that the company had engaged in
systemic race discrimination in its compensation system, that the
company's performance appraisal system was fundamentally flawed,
221. Kurt Eichenwald of The New York Times broke stories of both overt
discrimination and Texaco's cover-up. See Texaco Executives, On Tape, supra note 2;
see also The Two Faces of Texaco, supra note 215. After these stories hit the press, the
company's relatively new CEO, Peter I. Bijur, faced scrutiny over tapes leaked to the
press in which Texaco senior officers made disparaging remarks about African-
Americans and Jews. ROBERTS VS. TEXACO, supra note 212, at 263. The tapes also
made clear the executives were illegally conspiring to destroy evidence subject to
discovery in the class action lawsuit Mehri had filed. Id. Almost immediately, class
representatives in the case received over two hundred requests for media interviews. Id.
at 264. Ted Koppel of ABC's Nightline interviewed Bijur, pressing him to the point
that he agreed to settle Roberts v. Texaco, on live TV, before an audience of millions.
Id. at 269-70.
222. 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001). This lawsuit settled in 2001 for a total
estimated at $192.5 million. See Summary of Settlement Agreement in Ingram v. The
Coca-Cola Company, at http://www/findjustice.com/ms/cases/coke/summaryl.htm (last
visited Dec. 15, 2003). As in Roberts v. Texaco, the discovery process that served as
the basis for an eventual motion for class certification yielded evidence about
discrimination at The Coca-Cola Company. The discrimination at the Coca-Cola
Company was far more subtle than at Texaco. Executives were never caught on tape
making racist comments and plans to shred documents, as they had been at Texaco.
The discrimination was more subtle and data driven, which meant that reports about the
case included data comparing the way the company treated white and black employees.
Henry Unger, a reporter for The Atlanta Joumal-Constitution, presented detailed
accounts of discrimination at Coke after reviewing the legal complaint filed by
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Henry Unger, Discrimination Lawsuit-Coca-Cola Accused of
"Companywide Pattern", ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 24, 1999, at H1. Unger's article
includes salary data for white and African-American employees, a chart comparing the
number of white and black employees in senior management revenue and non-revenue
generating divisions of the company and a chart comparing the number of white and
black employees in particular pay grades at the company. Id. This information came
from the plaintiffs' complaint.
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allowing unchecked managerial discretion that worked against African-
American employees, and, finally, that promotion practices did not
assure equal opportunity. 23  Plaintiffs alleged that a "glass ceiling"
prevented African-American employees from climbing to high levels
within the company.224 Another similarity between the Texaco and
Coca-Cola cases is that the company failed to listen to high-level
employees, who had raised concerns about unfair treatment of African-
American employees in 1995, four years before plaintiffs filed the class
action lawsuit.225 Here, however, the employee who raised the concerns
was not subjected to racial slurs. Instead, company executives simply
ignored the information and failed to act to correct problems.
Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Company added a new theory to the line
of cases-the theory known as "glass walls. '226  Plaintiffs gathered
223. See Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 687.
224. For a description of the glass ceiling in employment for many groups, including
African-Americans and women, see Many Paths to Justice, supra note 208.
225. See Nikhil Deogun, Coke Was Told In '95 of Need for Diversity, WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Coke Was Told]; see Henry Unger, Revised Suit Cites
Coca-Cola Execs in Motion: Plaintiffs Say Managers Have Known of Companywide
Discrimination Since 1995, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 21, 1999, at DI; see also Henry
Unger, Facing Suit, Coca-Cola Steps up Diversity Efforts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May
27, 1999, at Fl [hereinafter Facing Suit]. Carl Ware, the highest ranking African-
American at The Coca-Cola Company had met in 1995 with three other high-ranking
African-American executives, Juan D. Johnson, Ingrid Saunders Jones, and Thomas A.
Peters at the request of then Chairman and Chief Executive M. Douglas Ivester. Henry
Unger, Confidential Coke Documents Released, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 2000, at
El [hereinafter Documents Released]. This group met for a day and a half to talk about
how the company might improve its efforts to help young African-American executives
move up in the company. Facing Suit, supra note 225. The group's report later became
known as The Ware Report. Documents Released, supra note 225. In the report, Ware
pointed out that the company failed to recognize the skills and intelligence of African-
American employees and ignored their potential for employment in certain aspects of
the business, especially departments related directly to profit and loss. Id. Ware also
pointed out instances when African American employees felt "humiliated, ignored,
overlooked, or unacknowledged." Id. Ware's report urged the company to develop a
mentoring program to link high potential African American employees with senior
managers. Id. Overall, he urged the company to create a "gold standard" for
management diversity. Coke Was Told, supra note 225.
226. See Coke Was Told, supra note 225. Unger reported the details of the litigation
after reviewing the plaintiffs' complaint. This complaint explained that the metaphor of
a glass wall refers to company actions "that segregate employees into divisions where
African-American leadership is acceptable, and divisions where it is not." Id. Some
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evidence that suggested the company made decisions based upon the
assumption that African-American leadership was acceptable in only
certain, non-revenue generating departments.2 7 Positions in non-
revenue-generating departments generally pay less and provide fewer
opportunities for advancement.
The next case, Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson,228 was another
company with an excellent reputation2 29 to be sued for systemic race
discrimination. Like the two cases outlined so far, the case against
Johnson & Johnson again alleges that company-wide practices are
intertwined with discriminatory impact and intent.2 10  The lawsuit's
companies channel black executives into particular kinds of jobs, especially jobs in non-
revenue areas, such as human resources, external affairs and community relations. Id.
These jobs are less likely to lead to promotions than jobs in revenue-generating areas
such as marketing and finance. See generally id.
227. See id.
228. See Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. CIV. A. 01-5302, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15418 (D. N.J. Aug. 12,2002).
229. Johnson & Johnson is well known for its ethics credo, "Our Credo"--which
promises to look out for all stakeholders, not just shareholders. With regard to
employees, the Credo states:
We are responsible to our employees, the men and women who work with us
throughout the world. Everyone must be considered as an individual. We must
respect their dignity and recognize their merit. They must have a sense of security in
their jobs. Compensation must be fair and adequate, and working conditions clean,
orderly and safe. We must be mindful of ways to help our employees fulfill their
family responsibilities. Employees must feel free to make suggestions and
complaints. There must be equal opportunity for employment, development and
advancement for those qualified. We must provide competent management, and their
actions must be just and ethical.
Our Credo at http://www.jnj.com/our company/our credo/index.htm (last visited July
15, 2003). The company also states that it values diversity. It states that:
[D]iversity is part of the culture of Johnson & Johnson, where we recognize the value
that differences in age, race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, physical ability,
thinking style and background bring a richness to the working environment. Our
vision is to be the Employer of Choice in a Dynamic Global Environment.
Diversity at http://www.jnj.com/community/diversity/index.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2003).
230. See Gutierrez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15418, at *4 (describing how plaintiffs
have filed systemic race discrimination lawsuits based upon Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e (1991)). To prove Title VII claims, plaintiffs
rely on disparate treatment and impact theories. See id. Most allegations have fallen
under the disparate impact theory, which focuses on human resources systems that
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allegations are similar in some ways to the Texaco and Coca-Cola
allegations.23' First, the Johnson & Johnson case alleges widespread
discrimination in promotions. 32  The lawsuit highlights the
discriminatory impact and intent in the company's job posting and
succession-planning systems.2 33  Like the Texaco and Coca-Cola
lawsuits, plaintiffs have evidence of both glass ceilings and glass
walls.2 34 In essence, the lawsuit points out the informal, behind-the-
scenes processes that allows white managers to choose favored white
candidates for promotion.235 Second, like the Texaco and Coca-Cola
lawsuits, the Johnson & Johnson case alleges widespread discrimination
in the company's compensation system.236
Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson brings new information and
allegations to the attention of stakeholders. This lawsuit: (1) highlights
discrimination against salaried employees of African and/or Hispanic
descent; (2) adds a claim of entry level salary bias, a claim that points
out that right at the first stage of the employment process, the company
overlooks and/or undervalues the qualifications of African-American
and Hispanic-American employees and offers them only certain kinds of
jobs237  (3) draws attention to new forms of discrimination in the
compensation arena, including discrimination in the distribution of stock
awards and options238 (4) highlights the lack of diversity within the
company's Board of Directors; (5) points out the failure of the Board of
appear to be racially neutral, but in fact operate to restrict opportunities for employees
who are racial minorities. See id. at *5.
231. See Gutierrez Complaint, supra note 209.
232. Id. at 14-23.
233. See id. at 18-22.
234. See id. at 22-23.
235. See id. at 14, 20, 22 (claiming that succession planning is a closed-door
nomination process during which predominately white management evaluates and picks
similar candidates, thus perpetuating the status quo and limiting diversity in the
workplace).
236. See id. at 23-27 (alleging that managers have too much discretion, resulting in
biases in entry level salary, merit increases, and cash bonuses).
237. Id.
238. See Cyrus Mehri & Steven Berk, Stock Option Equity: Building Democracy
While Building Wealth, LABOR & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE PVS MONTHLY
REVIEW OF MULTI-EMPLOYER PLAN PROXY ISSUES, Nov. 2002, at
http://www.pvsproxy.com/logon.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Stock
Option Equity].
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Directors and upper-level management to monitor, report and remedy
problems in its human resources operations; and (6) asks for punitive
damages against the company for reckless indifference to acts of
discrimination it has known about since 1997.39
The most recent case, Jenkins v. BellSouth Corporation,240 presents
claims of current and former employees, from 1998 to present. This
case adds to the line of cases alleging a pattern and practice of
discrimination against African-American employees. The lawsuit
highlights problems with promotion processes, compensation disparities
brought about primarily by a subjective performance review system,
ineffective procedures for resolving discrimination complaints within
the company, inadequate monitoring and reporting in the diversity arena,
failure to respond to and correct problems highlighted in the company's
own diversity reports, an absence of mandatory diversity training for
most managers and supervisors, and reckless indifference to legal
violations.24'
The BellSouth complaint asks the court to approve two classes, one
for salaried employees, and one for hourly employees.242 This fact is
important because, unlike the Texaco, Coca-Cola and Johnson &
Johnson cases, the BellSouth case is not only a glass ceiling case. The
BellSouth case is especially important because it challenges the way
testing procedures are handled for hourly workers. BellSouth challenges
invalidated tests BellSouth has used with the effect of discriminating
against African-American employees.243 In particular, plaintiffs allege
that the company uses tests that are unrelated to skills necessary to
perform particular jobs, and that these tests have a disparate impact on
minorities. 244 The issue matters because some companies, including
BellSouth, have used antiquated tests that are unrelated to job
239. See Gutierrez Complaint, supra note 209, at 5-7.
240. See Jenkins Complaint, supra note 209 (co-counsel included Joseph Sellers of
Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. and Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. of The Cochran
Firm).
241. See id. at 8-13.
242. See id. (noting that "Bellsouth has further discriminated against African
American hourly ... employees by... requiring them to pass the Access Management
testing process while similarly situated Caucasian employees are not required to do so
in order to obtain promotions to managerial positions..
243. Scariest Opponent, supra note 206.
244. Id. at 34.
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requirements to keep minorities out of certain job categories and training
opportunities. 245 These tests have a disparate impact on minority
employees, effectively preventing them from paths toward increased
wages. In essence, the BellSouth case includes a battle against certain
paper-and-pencil tests. Interestingly, lawyers fought this battle in
corporate America decades ago, and won.246 Unfortunately, it appears
that employers are capable of reaching back in time to re-create old
ways of discriminating. The plaintiffs' allegation in BellSouth regarding
paper-and-pencil tests highlights the need for companies to monitor and
report analyses of requirements for certain jobs, especially jobs that
allow some employees to make the transition to management
positions.247 Companies need to make sure they are providing equal
opportunities for upward advancement, without a preference for white
employees.
In all of these cases, from Texaco to BellSouth, upper-level
management and boards of directors would have benefited from having
information available to them on a regular basis that would have allowed
them to monitor the company's employment practices and reduce
litigation exposure. Senior company officials needed information about
what was happening in the company with regard to employment
discrimination/diversity. Increased knowledge would have set the stage
for companies to correct problems. Ideally, companies want to remedy
problems internally, before potential plaintiffs have no choice but to
seek the assistance of attorneys. We call the tool for information
gathering and reporting that we envision a "Diversity Report Card."
245. See, e.g., Maxey v. Alcoa Apprentice Selection Settlement (noting an example
of a company that has used antiquated tests to keep African-American employees out of
apprenticeship programs), available at
http://www.findjustice.com/ms/cases/alcoa/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
Although the complaint alleges that Bellsouth's tests are antiquated, a court has yet to
rule on the matter.
246. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of
Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 555 (1985). Caldwell discusses
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a United States Supreme Court case outlawed "testing
requirements that had a disproportionate exclusionary effect on black applicants and
employees." Id. at 558. She also reviews EEOC issued guidelines that placed
restrictions on the use of paper and pencil tests that appear neutral, but have a
disproportionate impact on groups protected by Title VII. Id. at 593.
247. Diversity Best Practices, supra note 206, at 60.
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Diversity Report Cards are tools that encourage information gathering
and reporting for the benefit of all stakeholders.
B. Diversity Report Cards for Employers and Stakeholders
This Article urges the SEC to issue regulations to guide companies
as they complete a Diversity Report Card. The SEC should require
companies to include report cards in their annual 10K filing. The
Diversity Report Card is a model for proper reporting. It presents a
yardstick upon which to judge management's performance and
ultimately place investors in a better position to make informed
decisions about where to place their money.248 When thinking about a
Diversity Report Card, readers should keep in mind that the primary idea
that underlies the report card is disclosure. 249  As Ralph Estes and
Martha Burk have commented:
Disclosure requirements are consistent with the basic concept of free
market economics and capitalism. Disclosure does not demand
intrusive government regulation, nor does it force employers to
change their hiring and compensation practices. Rather, it
248. Stock Option Equity, supra note 238, at 2.
249. It is important to note that some companies will want to go well beyond
disclosure. Many companies see the business rationale for increasing diversity in their
companies. See Diversity Best Practices, supra note 206, at 46. They see that increased
diversity creates stronger companies and hence makes economic sense. See generally
id. Companies interested in adopting diversity best practices may need ideas about how
to move forward to create and measure programs designed to enhance diversity at all
levels of the company. Id.
In Diversity Best Practices, David Aronson presents an excellent, comprehensive
review of best diversity practices for 21st century business. This article offers ideas for
employers that fall under a number of categories, including: general principles (e.g.,
employers should decide what the organization's short- and long-term diversity goals
should be); recruitment (e.g., employers should clarify job selection criteria before a
selection process begins); promotion and advancement (e.g., employers should make
educational and training opportunities widely available); terms and conditions (e.g.,
employers should conduct periodic "disability friendly" audits of the company's
physical work environment); termination and downsizing (e.g., employers should assist
terminated employees by providing services such as counseling); alternate dispute
resolution (e.g., employers should consider using employee hotlines, ombuds programs,
mediation, etc); management commitment and accountability (e.g., the company CEO
must provide strong support for diversity initiatives); and other practices (e.g.,
companies should conduct diversity training). Id. at 60-61.
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recognizes that the invisible hand of self-interest may go astray
without the invisible arm of accurate and adequate information.
250
On the opposite page, we present a sample Diversity Report Card,
which gives the reader a picture of what information a Diversity Report
Card could include.
.250. Ralph Estes & Martha Burk, Disclosure and Pay Equity: Let the Sunshine In, A
Briefing Paper for Lawmakers, Journalists, Candidates, and Citizens, available at
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/equity.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Disclosure and Pay Equity].
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Sample Diversity Report Card
SUBJECT DESCRIPTION
Applicants and New Hires - Breakdown by race, gender, and ethnicity.
Pay Equity - Range, median and mean salary and starting salary by job
title. Breakdown by race, gender, and ethnicity.
- List distribution of stock options and stock awards.
Breakdown by race, gender, and ethnicity.
Glass Ceiling -List the 150 highest paid employees. Breakdown by race,
gender, and ethnicity.
Reports Describing EEO- 1 reports
Diversity Progress and - List every notice of violation by the U.S. Department of
Challenges Labor OFCCP.
- List discrimination charges filed by the EEOC.
Board of Director - List candidates interviewed for Board positions.
Selection Breakdown by race, gender, and ethnicity.
To fulfill their objective of increasing workplace fairness, though,
companies must develop and complete this report card within a
particular context. In other words, proper reporting can take a company
only so far. For example, a company could implement exacting
standards for developing and completing a Diversity Report Card, but
the data the report card summarizes will not promote positive change
unless the board of directors that reads the report (1) benefits from
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, and (2) has in place a system that
ensures that boards of directors play an active role in governing with
regard to employment discrimination/workforce diversity.
With regard to board development, it is imperative that corporations
take steps to enhance the diversity of their boards.251 Subcommittees of
251. On September 12, 2003, Mehri & Skalet submitted comments to the Securities
& Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to proposed rule S7-14-03, which requires
companies to disclose the nominating procedures for corporate directors. Mehri &
Skalet Comment to the SEC (noting that diversity is of material importance because it is
valued by shareholders), available at http://www.findjustice.com/ms/pdf/KatzLetter.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003). Mehri & Skalet's comments urge the SEC to require
companies to disclose information that would allow shareholders to see whether a
company utilizes diverse candidate slates in the board member selection. Id. at 2. The
intent of this suggested requirement is to document efforts to obtain a final slate of
board candidates that includes minorities and women. Id. Mehri & Skalet's comments
assert that:
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the board responsible for developing the board must actively recruit
women and candidates of color who have the skills necessary to help
guide the company. These new board members will also serve as assets
by virtue of their diversity. Board members with varying backgrounds
and experiences may interpret differently the data a Diversity Report
Card presents. For instance, an African-American, Hispanic, or female
board member may read the Diversity Report Card and see red flags
indicating problems in human resources functions, while other board
members may read the same data and see business as usual. Companies
benefit when boards discover problem areas internally and correct
problems immediately.
With regard to systems that promote active governance,252 boards of
directors as a whole, or subcommittees of boards, must engage in serious
study of equal employment opportunity data on a regular basis. It may
help if the company's top leader appoints a senior-level manager to
work with the human resources department. This senior-level manager
could act as a liaison to the board, making sure the human resources
staff provides the kind of macro information the board needs to engage
in strategic decision-making.
Proper reporting also promotes workplace fairness in the context
of commitment and accountability. The company CEO and high-level
managers must support all company efforts to promote equal
opportunity. The board of directors must put in place a system that
holds the CEO and upper-level managers accountable for performance
objectives that relate to workplace fairness. The CEO must direct
operating unit presidents to set annual goals, report on progress toward
the goals, and link incentives to achievement of the goals. Reward-and-
recognition programs should tie bonuses, merit increases, and other
forms of compensation to success in achieving EEO/diversity goals.
Just as shareholders have a right to know the mechanism through which their boards
of directors are nominated, they have a right to know the extent to which the
nominating committee values racial, ethnic and gender diversity when assembling
slates of candidates and whether it makes concrete efforts to achieve diversity.
Id. Disclosure is important because it "makes good business sense, is consonant with
the spirit of extant securities regulation, and promotes values important to all those with
a stake in effective and responsible corporate governance." Id. In essence, investors
need data so they can make informed decisions.
252. The information presented in this paragraph comes from communications
between Marc Bendick, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri. Marc Bendick is a consultant with
Bendick and Egan Economic Consultants, Inc., located in Washington, D.C.
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C. Social Disclosure and Diversity Report Cards
Clearly, the Diversity Report Card we envision is consistent with
arguments in favor of social disclosure. Advocates of both the
predominant and progressive viewpoints are united in their quest to
improve information gathering and reporting processes, with the
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders in mind.253  We
appreciate some of the general observations the Harvard law review
students made when they argued in favor of mandatory disclosure. We
agree that information about employment discrimination/workforce
diversity may be a public good-something that companies have little
incentive to provide voluntarily. We assert, though, that forward-
thinking companies will see the value of gathering and reporting
information so they can solve problems internally.
We also agree that managers often lack incentives to engage in
voluntary, accurate information gathering and reporting. In fact,
engaging in reporting often complicates managers' jobs and holds them
accountable for an additional area of corporate operations. Managers
may be especially uninterested in engaging in this kind of reporting
when doing so highlights that they maybe have been using their
discretion inappropriately. For example, reports may make clear that a
particular company's managers are channeling African-American into
non-revenue generating departments, thereby lowering their opportunity
for upward advancement. The Board of Directors needs this information
so it can monitor and correct problems. Managers may not realize the
discriminatory nature of their decisions and if they are, may want to
keep this information secret. We also realize that third-party effects may
lead to less information gathering and reporting than we desire. We
consider this issue below, when we evaluate the students' analysis of
their fourth criterion.
With regard to the students' analysis of the four criteria they
delineate for when the SEC should mandate social disclosure of equal
opportunity data, we agree with the students' analysis of the first two
criteria. We wholeheartedly agree with the students' observation that
investors want the information. We also agree that it does not cost much
for employers to gather and report the kinds of equal employment
253. See supra Parts L.A-B.
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opportunity data that would help high-level officials monitor the
company's human resources operations.
In their third step, the students' analysis of the indirect costs of
social disclosure of equal employment opportunity data falls short.
Because the students were giving this social issue as a quick example,
they did not have the opportunity to explore fully the ways in which
discrimination plays out in corporations today. Their intuition that much
of the discrimination that exists in corporations today is neutral in intent
is on track. Employers are unlikely to be acting on behalf of investors
who have a "taste" for discrimination. However, the students needed
more information to describe accurately how employers discriminate.
Rather than focusing primarily on "statistical discrimination" in
employee selection processes, they needed to make clear the many ways
in which employers are discriminating. For instance, the analysis
needed to highlight systemic discrimination in compensation and
performance appraisal systems. This section also needed to highlight
issues such as glass ceilings and walls. In spite of this missing
information, the students' conclusion with regard to this criterion is
correct. Investors are likely to want to sacrifice some profits if the
profits are derived from behavior they find objectionable. When
investors see information suggesting the company's profits are tied to
undervaluing and underpaying employees because of their race, they are
likely to want to put a stop to the pattern of illegality even if they lose
some money as a consequence.
Finally, with regard to third-party effects, the students argued that
disclosure should be mandatory in situations in which a particular
company could benefit from keeping its own data secret, despite
investors' collective interests. 54 Companies will not want to highlight
their diversity records if doing so puts them at a disadvantage and makes
an entire industry look flawed. We agree with the students that
companies are unlikely to engage in voluntary information gathering and
reporting of employment discrimination/workforce diversity data if they
believe they alone will suffer investor and customer backlash when
many other companies with similarly poor records but are successful at
hiding information. 5  However, we must make two observations that
254. Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 11, at 1452.
255. Writers have urged employers to engage in steps to avoid liability.
Unfortunately, some of this work has a negative tone, in that it focuses on preventing
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show the complexity of third-party effects. Both observations are based
upon our positive impressions of particular companies that have suffered
through human resources scandals and failures.
First, our experience in litigating and studying discrimination cases
suggests that the Harvard students are incorrect when they assume that
corporations typically know when they are discriminating and have an
incentive to hide the facts from investors and other stakeholders. What
we see is that many companies are completely unaware that they are
discriminating. They do not realize they are engaging in systemic
discrimination based upon race, ethnicity and/or gender. While the
students apparently want to mandate disclosure so companies will be
forced to own up to their failures, we advocate mandatory disclosure to
shake companies out of denial.
Second, we sense that the Harvard students see mandatory
disclosure in a somewhat punitive light. We do not, primarily because
we have witnessed positive outcomes from mandatory information
gathering and reporting. We see competitive advantages for companies
that are able to say, "We have enacted best practices to promote
diversity.', 25 6  For example, it is common knowledge that Texaco
completely transformed its corporate culture as a consequence of a court
mandate that came about as part of a lawsuit settlement. Although this
transformation did not come about voluntarily, in hindsight, it was good
for the company and all its stakeholders. Consider the following
statement from Mr. Tim Smith of the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR).257 ICCR is an association of 275 religious
investors, including the Roman Catholic health and hospital chains.258
Speaking for these investors at a panel discussion on corporate social
lawsuits rather than promoting equality. See, e.g., Michael Delikat, The Texaco Case
and Lessons to Learn: How Can Corporations Manage Diversity Effectively?, in
LITIGATION & ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES H4-5256, 181
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1997); see also Laura Spatz O'Donnell, Workplace
Advisor: Think Ahead to Thwart Lawsuits Q & A, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan.
12, 2003.
256. Disclosure and Pay Equity, supra note 250.
257. Currently, Timothy Smith is senior vice president and director of socially
responsible investing at Walden Asset Management. Before joining Walden in 2000,
he served as Executive Director of the ICCR for 24 years. Smith has a Masters in
Divinity from Union Theological Seminary.
258. See Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, at
http://iccr.org/about/index.ntm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
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responsibility at a Cornell Law Review-sponsored event in 1998, Smith
offered these comments about Texaco:
Of course, virtually every company we talk to or you would discuss
issues with says they are committed to nondiscrimination in
employment. We are talking about equal employment opportunity,
shattering the glass ceiling, and diversifying boards of directors. So
we need to look beyond the statement, "we are equal opportunity
employer, we don't discriminate," and look at what leadership means
for a company on the diversity issue.
I think it might be interesting to look at some of the steps that
Texaco is taking to illustrate this broader question [of what it means
to be socially responsible.] First of all, Texaco, as part of their
rigorous present process, is reviewing all levels of its company to
ensure it is moving towards true diversity. That is the general theme.
It is attempting to break open the glass ceiling....
Texaco is diversifying, and has been diversifying its board. Texaco
publishes an annual report on diversity, including the hard
numbers-where their EEO numbers stand-and what changes have
occurred in the last three years. Texaco tracks these numbers for
itself and lets the shareholders and others review those numbers ...
Moreover, I think that Texaco is stressing that this is not simply a
do-good program... you hear management say again and again that
leveraging diversity and the talents of all their people is essential for
a profitable future for the company.
Now, I don't mention this as an advertisement for Texaco, but I
mention this as sort of a breakdown of what it means to be a leader
in equal employment opportunity .... Diversity is seen as a value in
governance that is a value for shareholders. 259
Tim Smith's comments remind us that just because a standard is
mandatory does not mean it is bad for anyone. In hindsight, a court's
mandate that Texaco change simultaneously promoted transparency,
accountability, and workplace fairness. When a company stands and
discloses the facts, as Texaco has done, this company will enjoy a
259. Corporate Social Responsibility Symposium, supra note 67, at 1303-04.
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competitive advantage because it has adopted diversity best practices.
Thus, with regard to third-party effects, we agree with the Harvard
students that mandatory disclosure is good in that it makes all companies
show the world their practices. However, we add the comment that,
when all companies disclose, some will stand out because the
information will demonstrate their commitment to equality.
CONCLUSION
At this point, it is important for us to "take stock," to come full
circle, and reconsider the fundamental question that drives our analysis:
Why should the SEC mandate social disclosure of workforce diversity
data through the use of the Diversity Report Card we outline? This
Diversity Report Card stands serves as a model for how companies that
embrace corporate social responsibility should proceed in promoting
transparency, accountability, and workplace fairness.
Advocates of the predominant view of corporate social
responsibility realize that managers who act in the interests of
shareholders should welcome improved processes for information
gathering and reporting. Managers who shape dynamic corporate
cultures prepared to respond to the challenges of operating in a global
arena should be pleased to offer information that highlights effective,
responsible operations, including legally sound, fair human resources
operations. With improved disclosures, individual and institutional
investors will have the data they need to make informed investment
decisions. They will respond quickly, rewarding managers who provide
leadership in creating level playing fields. Over time, many investors
will recognize increased shareholder value created by leadership that
understands diversity, and will see this shareholder value as a barometer
of good management. Consequently, additional investors will offer
resources to those well-run companies.
Advocates of the progressive view of corporate social responsibility
realize that managers who act in the interest of all stakeholders-
shareholders and employees, suppliers and customers-should welcome
improved processes for information gathering and reporting. Managers
who shape dynamic corporate cultures prepared to attract the best
employee talent should be pleased to offer information that assures
employees that managers will judge them based their effort, initiative,
and merit, rather than upon the color of their skin. With improved
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disclosures, employees will have the information they need to make
informed decisions about where they want to invest their time and talent.
Similarly, suppliers with the best resources will want to establish
relationships with companies that provide leadership in creating level
playing fields. Additionally, informed customers will "vote with their
dollars." As minority groups grow in size and spending power, they will
spend their dollars rewarding companies that demonstrate sensitivity and
a keen understanding of what customers need. Over time, employees,
suppliers and customers will stand with investors, ready to respond to
data that allows them to reward companies that show awareness of,
respect for, and responsiveness to innovation, new thinking, and
fairness.
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reminded us in her majority
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, "[e]ffective participation by members of
all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if
the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. 2 60 American
citizens of all gender, racial and ethnic groups are more likely to
participate in society as corporate stakeholders when they have the
information they need to assess the extent to which a particular
corporation's human resources system have eliminated conscious and
unconscious bias. The model for information gathering and reporting
this Article advocates helps eliminate bias. It sits at the nexus of
agreement where the pursuit of workplace fairness and corporate success
coexist. Our proposed Diversity Report Card is a progressive and
productive manifestation of the convergence of legal and ethical custom.
260. 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
